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1.  ACTIVE INCLUSION: A EUROPEAN STRATEGY TO FIGHT SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
 
Active inclusion entails reaching out to the most disadvantaged and enabling them to 
fully participate in society, including the labour market. It is one of the priority social 
policy areas at EU level. The 2008 European Commission recommendation on active 
inclusion introduced an ambitious plan for Member States based on the integrated 
implementation of three pillars: adequate income support, inclusive labour markets, and 
access to quality services. 
Four years later, it is time to assess how Member States have responded. This Staff 
Working Document (SWD) prepared by the Commission with the support of various 
stakeholders has identified the main challenges to active inclusion implementation. These 
challenges include inadequacy, low coverage, and non-take-up of minimum income 
support, possible disincentives to work, in-work poverty, insufficient access to services, 
and lack of an integrated approach (including inadequate vertical and horizontal 
coordination, and lack of single access points). Intensified budgetary constraints in the 
context of the economic crisis and increasing demographic dependency ratios
1 have 
exacerbated the challenges to the proper implementation of active inclusion strategies.   
The above challenges signal the importance for Member States and the Union to move 
towards a social investment approach highlighting — among others — the long-term 
benefits of active inclusion. Social investment seeks to develop people’s human capital, 
improving their ability to participate in the labour market, while also preventing the 
greater social and economic costs that can arise from an unskilled workforce and people 
experiencing social exclusion. The successful implementation of active inclusion 
strategies will require well-coordinated and intensified efforts at local, national, and 
European levels, and this document contains concrete policy guidance to assist 
governments, civil society organisations, and practitioners.   
  
 
1.1.  Background 
On 3 October 2008, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation on the active 
inclusion of people excluded from the labour market. This promoted a comprehensive 
strategy based on integrating three pillars of social policy: adequate income support, 
inclusive labour markets, and access to quality services.
2 The Council and European 
Parliament endorsed the strategy.
3 
4 
                                                 
1   See SWD on Evidence on Demographic and Social Trends, SWD(2013) 38. 
2   See Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2008 on the active inclusion of people excluded from the 
labour market (2008/867/EC published in the OJ L. 307/11 of 18.11.2008). . 
3   See Council Conclusions of 17 December 2008 on ‘Common active inclusion principles to combat 
poverty more effectively’. 
4   See European Parliament Resolution of 6.5.2009 on the active inclusion of people excluded from the 
labour market (2008/2335(INI)).  
4 
Active inclusion strategies aim to help integrate those who can work into sustainable, 
quality employment, and to provide enough resources with which to live in dignity for 
those who cannot. The three pillars cited above can achieve this by: 
-  Providing adequate, well-designed income support for those who need it, while 
helping them back into jobs, for example by linking out-of-work and in-work 
benefits. 
-  Ensuring inclusive labour markets and employment policies that address the needs 
of those least likely to get a job. 
-  Providing quality social services to support active social participation. 
The recommendation also calls for: 
(1)   comprehensive policy design (by considering joint impacts, possible synergies 
and trade-offs), 
(2)    integrated implementation, 
(3)    policy coordination among various levels of governments, and 
(4) active participation of civil society organisations in the development, 
implementation and evaluation strategies. 
 
The Commission has stressed the importance of integrating active inclusion policies. 
Piecemeal implementation will not achieve the results that a concerted effort on all three 
fronts can bring about to get people back into jobs, even if they have been among the 
long-term unemployed. 
Active inclusion fits well into the life-cycle approach taken by the Social Investment 
Package, where exposure to the risk of poverty and exclusion is not static. A well-
designed active inclusion strategy should enable individuals to quickly return to society, 
preferably through participation in the labour market. The recommendation emphasises 
the  importance of investing in human capital, in line with the Social Investment 
Package. Strengthening inclusive labour markets should be done through ‘inclusive 
education and training policies’ that adapt to ‘new competence requirements’ and ‘the 
need for digital skills.’ Quality services also contribute to the development of human 
capital. 
The pillars of active inclusion are linked to social investment. The one-stop-shop 
model promoted by the active inclusion strategy contributes to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of social protection systems. Activating and enabling policies and adequate 
livelihoods promote policies of inclusive labour markets and adequate income support. 
Investing in children and young people reinforces the importance of enabling services. 
Thus, the active inclusion strategy forms an integral part of the social investment 
approach. 
At the outbreak of the economic crisis, the European Commission engaged in a concerted 
effort to realign European economies onto the path of smart, inclusive growth. This was 
reflected in the launch of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Member States endorsed this 
strategy, and most made explicit commitments towards achieving the targets — including 
those on poverty.
5 
                                                 
5   European Council Conclusions, 17 June 2010, EUCO 13/10.  
5 
Three of the five headline targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy are related to the active 
inclusion policy. Pillar 2 of the active inclusion strategy (inclusive labour markets) which 
focuses on activating those furthest from the labour market is key for the achievement of 
the employment target (75 % of those between the ages of 20 and 64 to be employed). 
The  education goals can also be facilitated through active inclusion strategies by 
focusing on services (such as training, education) for those who are disadvantaged. 
Effective active inclusion is perhaps most relevant for reducing poverty (at least 20 
million people fewer in poverty or at risk of it and social exclusion). Those furthest from 
the labour market are the core target of the active inclusion strategy. 
The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion,
6 one of Europe 2020’s 
seven flagship initiatives, argues that with the active inclusion strategy, the EU has a 
common set of principles to fight against poverty. 
The adoption of the 2008 recommendation coincided with the start of the global financial 
crisis, which had a significant impact on the socio-economic environment. The financial 
crisis, followed by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe forced many governments to 
reduce public spending drastically, while the number of those unemployed and at risk of 
poverty rose sharply. Social protection systems have been put under pressure, and a 
number of Member States have been forced to reduce spending while faced with 
increased caseloads. 
This document reviews the implementation of the recommendation at national level.
7 
Part 1 (chapters 1 and 2) of the document provides a synthesis of the analysis from Part 
2, and gives concrete policy guidance based on the results of the analysis. 
Part 2 (chapters 3 to 6) reviews policy developments at national level since the adoption 
of the 2008 Recommendation, focusing on the three pillars of the strategy. It looks at the 
challenges specific to each pillar as well as the issues related to the integrated delivery of 
the strategy. It also discusses the role of the social open method of coordination as well 
as the Europe 2020 Strategy in shaping European level social inclusion policies, and 
looks at relevant European level initiatives and strategies. 
 
1.2.  A brief synthesis 
The summary table on the main policy characteristics (derived from Tables 1-4 of the 
Annex) suggests that the countries with the best outcomes are those with policy 
characteristics comparable to the active inclusion principles. 
                                                 
6   COM/2010/0758 final. 
7   The review is based on several sources. First, the Commission asked Member States (via the Social 
Protection Committee (SPC) to complete a survey on active inclusion. The SPC also held two thematic 
surveillances on active inclusion in which selected Member States presented their strategies. A number 
of PROGRESS-financed activities have contributed materials to this report: reports written by the EU 
Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion, by MISSOC, and by EUROMOD. National 
Social Reports (2012) and National Reform Programmes (2011, 2012) were also used. The Indicators 
Sub-group (ISG) of the Social Protection Committee also worked on developing indicators for the 
strategy. Peer review seminars (under the auspices of the SPC) contributed to a better understanding of 
specific aspects of active inclusion. Civil society organisations participated in an informal consultation 
in which they expressed their views on implementation of the strategy. Finally, academic papers, 
documents prepared in-house by the Commission and reports from other organisations such as the 
OECD and the World Bank were used in the report. .  
6 
These countries (mainly from groups A and B) are characterised by high coverage and 
medium to high levels of generosity regarding income support (first pillar). They have 
low labour market segmentation, high activation (second pillar), high use of childcare, 
and high participation in education and training of those with a low standard of education 
(third pillar). However, their safety net benefit systems are more likely to create 
disincentives to work. 
Ranked lower down are groups D and E with social protection systems not in line with 
active inclusion principles. Such systems are characterised by low coverage and low-
generosity income support
8 for working age people (first pillar), high labour market 
segmentation, mainly low activation (second pillar), low use of childcare, and low 
participation in education and training for those with a low standard of education (third 
pillar). However, their safety net benefit systems tend not to create disincentives to work.   
Not surprisingly, there is a high correlation between the situation of people facing 
poverty in a given Member State, and the robustness of that country’s social 
protection system.     
 
                                                 
8   Notice that these same systems are also often characterised by  generous pension systems   
7 
Table 1. Summary of the main policy characteristics
9 
  First pillar  Second pillar  Third pillar 
 
Unemployment 
benefits  
first level of safety nets 
Other benefits  
second level of safety 
nets 
Inclusive labour 
markets 
Access to services 
Group 
A 
CZ FR 
NL AT 
SI SE 
(CY) 
High coverage (SI) 
Medium to high 
generosity 
Long duration (CY) 
High disincentives 
High coverage 
Medium to high 
generosity 
High disincentives 
(especially for second 
earners) 
Low segmentation (FR) 
High activation (SI, CZ) 
No low wage trap 
High childcare use 
(NL, AT, CZ) 
High participation in 
educ/training (FR, 
CY) 
Group 
B 
BE DK 
DE FI 
UK 
Very high coverage 
(UK) 
High generosity 
High disincentives (UK) 
Long duration (UK) 
High coverage 
High generosity 
High disincentives 
(especially for second 
earners) UK 
High activation (UK) 
Low wage trap  
High childcare (UK) 
Medium 
participation in 
educ/training (BE, 
UK) 
Group 
C 
Ireland 
Very high generosity 
High disincentives 
 
Very high generosity 
High disincentives 
High activation 
Low child care use 
Low participation in 
education and 
training 
Group 
D 
BG HU 
IT MT 
PL RO 
Medium coverage (BG, 
PL) 
Low generosity 
Low disincentives  
Low coverage (MT, HU) 
Low generosity 
Low disincentives 
High segmentation 
Low activation 
Low wage trap 
especially for 2
nd 
earner(BG, RO) 
 
Low childcare use 
Low participation in 
education and 
training (PL) 
Group 
E 
EE EL 
ES LV 
LT PT 
SK 
Low coverage 
Low generosity 
Low disincentives (LT 
LV) 
Low coverage 
Low generosity (except 
LT for lone parents) 
Low disincentives 
(except for 2nd earners 
in LT, LV) 
High segmentation 
Low activation (ES, PT) 
No low wage trap 
Medium childcare 
use (SK) 
Medium/Low 
participation in 
educ/training (PT EL 
ES) 
See detailed tables in Annex (Outlier countries are signalled in strikeout font CC indicating that 
the given characteristic does not apply to that country) 
 
The various assessment and evaluation exercises have identified the major challenges 
active inclusion policies face with respect to the three pillars. 
First pillar: regarding adequate income support, the main challenges identified in the 
assessment are adequacy and coverage (both strongly affected by the recession), non-
take-up, and disincentives to work. Though most Member States extended social 
benefits at the start of the crisis, the dropping of temporary stimulus measures and budget 
constraints since then have had a negative impact on adequacy and coverage (restricting 
eligibility) for some. 
                                                 
9   Based on data from: Eurostat EU-SILC, Eurostat LFS, OECD Tax and Benefit model, Eurostat LMP 
database, and OECD. No data available on coverage for CY, SE, FI, IE, and LT. No data available on 
adequacy of social assistance and housing support for CY and IT. No data available on unemployment 
and inactivity trap for CY. No data available on transition from temporary to permanent employment 
for DK and IE. No data available on poverty transitions for SE, DE, PL, PT, SK, and RO. No data 
available on low wage trap for CZ and FR. No data available on the use of formal childcare for CZ. No 
data available on housing overburden cost for DE.  
8 
Non-take-up is a matter of concern and needs to be carefully monitored. Member States 
have recognised the issue and most have  introduced  measures to increase take-up, 
including  simpler application procedures and better information for potential 
claimants about entitlement and application procedures. ‘One-stop shops’ introduced in 
some Member States have also helped to boost take-up, by informing people applying for 
one benefit that they may be entitled to others. 
Second pillar: inclusive labour markets. The main concerns identified in the 
assessment are in-work poverty and disincentives that may arise from tax and benefits 
systems. This continues to be a problem in a number of Member States. Ensuring that tax 
and benefits systems contribute to make work pay is essential to avoid poverty traps. 
Member States should make sure that proper incentives are in place, so that people can 
move smoothly from benefit support to employment. 
Helping the most disadvantaged get back into work is crucial, given an ageing population 
and the on-going economic crisis. Stakeholders must protect, up-skill and activate 
dormant human capital. That is why it is important to understand how effective labour 
market activation programmes can boost their earnings potential,
10 clear evidence for 
investment that leads to smart and inclusive growth. 
Third pillar: access to quality services. This has been a problem for a number of 
Member States. Children are disproportionately affected by poverty. Access to services is 
often difficult for specific disadvantaged groups, such as the Roma, some groups of 
migrants, and people with disabilities. 
High-quality services should be made available to all citizens to achieve the considerable 
redistributive and poverty-reducing potential of these services. Member States 
undertaking reforms to improve these services should bear in mind their poverty 
alleviating effects. 
Member States have reported little progress in providing an integrated comprehensive 
strategy for active inclusion. Almost all are planning partial implementation, but have 
difficulties or challenges with integrated provision of active inclusion. These difficulties 
are often due to lack of administrative capacity, or to the vertical and horizontal 
coordination of the three pillars. 
There are, however, some promising examples (e.g. IE, SI)
11 that can serve as models for 
others. At local level, the EU Network experts note that the introduction of ‘one-stop-
shops’ in some Member States has been a successful way of ensuring effective 
coordination in delivering assistance under different schemes. 
Civil society organisations have reported limited involvement in the design and 
implementation of active inclusion strategies at national level. 
More needs to be done to fully implement active inclusion reforms, especially: 
•  reorganising frontline services to provide one-stop-shops for vulnerable people; 
•  modernising social protection systems towards greater effectiveness and 
efficiency; 
                                                 
10   In a study looking at 59 labour activation programmes from the US, on average the offices increased 
the programme group’s earnings by 18 % compared to the control group. Source: World Bank 
presentation: Applying best practices from the OECD: Implementation challenges for employment 
activation programs in MICs, Istanbul, April 2012. 
11   Based on the SPC multilateral thematic surveillance on active inclusion (27 February 2012).  
9 
•  linking employment policies with social support. 
As a result of the assessment concrete steps are proposed below for both Member States 
and EU institutions. 
2.  GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE INCLUSION 
This guidance identifies steps for sound social investment to implement active inclusion 
strategies. The Commission recommends improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
Member States’ income support programmes, especially with regard to adequacy, 
coverage, take-up and incentives to work, so that they can reach those most 
disadvantaged and deliver at full capacity. 
 
The guidance promotes a holistic approach to active labour market policies, explaining: 
- the optimal sequencing of activation 
- the merits of personalised approaches for the most excluded 
- how Member States can provide optimal tax and benefit support to encourage 
employment and reduce in-work poverty. 
 
It also provides guidance on how to ensure access to enabling services, recommending a 
‘one-stop shop’ approach, including better administrative coordination and capacity. 
 
This guidance is also a tool for the Commission to assess Member States’ performance in 
the European Semester and points to the way in which Structural funds can contribute to 
achieving poverty reduction and social inclusion targets. 
The guidance can also be the basis for funding priorities on social innovation and social 
policy experimentation. It is backed by best practices and evidence presented in this 
document. 
2.1.  Adequate income support 
2.1.1.  What money can buy 
Adequate livelihoods (income support) are an essential part of the active inclusion 
strategy.
12 The debate on the adequacy of minimum income measured in relation to the 
median income (whether it is 60 %, 50 %, or 40 %)
13 is not conclusive. In a recent 
paper,
14 researchers from the University of Antwerp argue that only a minimum income 
level no higher than 40 % would eliminate inactivity traps.
15 One way to refocus attention 
                                                 
12   See the chapter (4.1) on the first pillar of active inclusion in this document. 
13   The European Parliament in its Resolution the Role of minimum income in combating poverty and 
promoting an inclusive society in Europe (reference — SP(2011)609) of 6 October 2010 states that 
‘adequate minimum income schemes must set minimum incomes at the level equivalent to at least 
60 % of median income in the Member State concerned.’ On the other hand, the European 
Commission, in its 2008 recommendation on active inclusion does not provide a precise definition of 
adequate income support. 
14   Frank Vandenbroucke, Bea Cantillon, Natascha Van Mechelen, Tim Goedeme, Anne Van Lancker 
(2012). The EU and Minimum Income Protection: Clarifying the Policy Conundrum, CSB Working 
Paper, No 12/5. . 
15 ‘The Europe-wide introduction of social assistance minimums equal to 60 % of national median 
equivalent income would create a financial inactivity trap in no fewer than eleven Member States: in 
  
10 
on the importance of adequacy is by looking at reference budgets,
16 which give a good 
indication of differences in consumption patterns and the cost of living across Member 
States. Reference budgets would be especially useful in those with low adequacy of 
minimum income (measured in relation to the median income). 
•  Developing reference budgets would enhance understanding of what expenses 
could be covered through minimum income support. The development and 
application of reference budgets should have two phases: 1. Design of reference 
budgets (timeline: max. one year);
 17 2. Monitoring and updating of reference 
budgets (continuous). 
 
2.1.2.  Gradual phasing out of income support 
Moving from social assistance (or other forms of income support) to paid employment 
creates a degree of disincentive. The exact degree depends on the difference between the 
value of the social assistance and the value of earned income. The closer the two, the 
bigger the disincentive to return to work. The way social assistance is phased out is also 
relevant. Immediate withdrawal creates more disincentives, while gradual withdrawal is 
less likely to deter someone from taking a job. 
•  Structuring phase-outs
18 in a way that strengthens incentives to take a job
19 
can help to end benefit dependency. Phasing out should take into consideration the 
cost of doing so.
20 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania, the net income of a single benefit recipient would be 
between 25 % and 30 % higher than the equivalent income of a single person working at minimum 
wage; in Spain and the Czech Republic, the relative advantage of the benefit claimant would amount to 
between 14 % and 16 %. Less severe dependency traps would appear in Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom. If the minimum benefits were to be raised to 50 % of median 
equivalent income, then the hypothetical unemployment traps would obviously be smaller, but they 
would still be substantial in the case of Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia and Bulgaria (between 5 and 9 %). 
Only if benefits were augmented to 40 % of the median would it pay in all countries to switch from 
social benefits to the minimum wage.’ Pg. 26, Vandenbroucke et al. (2012). 
16   Reference budgets (or budget standards) contain a list of goods and services that a family of a specific 
size and composition needs to be able to live at a designated level of wellbeing, along with the 
estimated monthly or annual costs thereof. Source: European Consumer Debt Network (2009). 
Handbook of reference budgets, pp. 5. 
17   In the framework of the FP7-SSH Research Project ImPRovE (Poverty Reduction in Europe: Social 
Policy and Innovation — http://improve-research.eu/) a common methodology for the construction of 
cross-nationally comparative reference budgets will be developed and applied to five EU member 
states. (for details see: http://improve-research.eu/?page_id=174). 
18   A recent example of gradual phasing out is the French Revenu de Solidarité Active. 
19   In Germany income support is not reduced at all for the first couple of hours of work, while phase-outs 
are quite steep for those working in jobs that could lift them out of poverty. The result is that there are 
many so-called ‘mini-job’ holders who remain dependent on benefits. 
20   Gradual phasing out may have budgetary implications. If the lower end of the income distribution is 
quite large (meaning that lot of people would participate in minimum income type programmes) then 
longer (or gradual) phasing out would result in higher overall spending. See: Marx et al. (2011). 
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2.1.3.  Improving efficiency and effectiveness: reaching out to the most 
disadvantaged 
Low coverage and non-take up directly affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
social assistance schemes. It is not enough just to have programmes. It is also important 
to reach those most disadvantaged, and ensure that policies are delivering at full 
capacity. Boosting the coverage and take-up of minimum income schemes will certainly 
contribute to reducing poverty.
 21 
•  Simpler procedures and better information for potential beneficiaries would 
boost take-up rates. 
•  Minimum income schemes should be assessed in relation to their contribution to 
achieving the national poverty targets.
22 
• 
Besides horizontal comparisons (poverty target, minimum income coverage, and 
take-up rate), cross-country comparison of coverage and take-up rates should be 
carried out in the context of European Semesters. 
•  Use social policy experimentation to examine ways to better reach out to the 
people furthest from the labour market 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Combating in-work poverty in Continental Europe: an investigation using the Belgian case’, Journal 
of Social Policy, 41/1, pp. 19-41. 
21   As shown in the graph below, rather than just going ahead and creating new programmes, the coverage 
and/or take-up of existing programmes should be assessed first. So if, for example, the national 
poverty target is to reduce in-work poverty, then it is worth checking whether the working poor are 
eligible for social assistance. If not, eligibility could be extended. If yes, then the take-up rate should 
be checked. If it is low, then new measures targeting a group could be introduced to help reach the 
target. These might involve simplifying procedures, campaigns or automatic take-up. 
22   If it is successful, the linking of poverty target could be extended to the other pillars of active inclusion 
(specifically to the various services).  
12 
2.2.  Inclusive labour markets 
Activation is only successful if there is a concerted effort on both sides: 
•  demand side: incentives to businesses, in line with the EU State aid rules 
(including support for investment in human capital, wage subsidies, tax allowances, 
etc.), can play an important role, 
•  supply side: Active labour market policies (ALMPs), support for life-long 
learning, tax credits, in-work support etc. are needed. 
ALMPs cannot compensate for structural barriers to job creation, such as excessively 
strict employment protection legislation, and they cannot be expected to compensate for 
cyclical labour market downturns. 
2.2.1.  Proper sequencing and targeting of activation 
Growing evidence on successful labour market programmes shows: 
•  short-run impacts: it appears that job search assistance programmes have 
relatively favourable short-run impacts, 
•  medium-term impacts: formal education and on-the-job training programmes 
tend to show better outcomes in the medium-run.
23 
It is therefore extremely important to choose the right activation measures, taking into 
consideration the specific circumstances. 
The longer someone has been unemployed, the likelier they are to find it hard to get 
back into work. The  duration  of unemployment is thus an important indicator, so 
programmes can be tailored to that criterion. Young people who have dropped out of 
school could be another example of a group requiring a specific programme. 
•  Effective ALMPs should be sequenced based on the duration of unemployment 
and the intensity of activation and employment support: from active job search, 
through counselling to targeted programmes.
24 
                                                 
23   David Card, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber (2009). Active labour market policy evaluations: a 
meta-analysis, IZA Discussion Paper, 4002. 
24    Based on the presentation of T. Andersen: Active labour market policy: Theory and Danish 
experiences, IZA/World Bank/OECD Conference on activation and employment support policies, 
April 2012, Istanbul, Turkey. For example: someone who has just lost their job may still have many 
links with the labour market through contacts with ex-colleagues, friends, etc. Their skills are also 
likely to be ‘up-to-date’, and marketable. So the immediate strategy should be an active job search. 
Only if this fails should job counselling be activated. Counselling should provide broader, 
individualised support suited to the individual’s skills and field of work. If this fails, then it is time for 
targeted re-training to acquire marketable skills. This may be through job training, but may involve 
formal education or vocational training.  
13 
 
•  Activation and employment support programmes  should be matched to 
specific client criteria. For instance, extensive educational programmes could be 
made available only to young people who are unemployed and do not have formal 
education. Investing in the development of more sophisticated targeting (such as 
profiling) could shorten the time a person needs to find a job, while cutting the cost 
of activation.
25 
•  Proper sequencing of activation should be incorporated in the individual 
contract
26 between the recipient and the service provider. 
2.2.2.  Providing optimal tax and benefit support to encourage employment 
and reduce in-work poverty 
Back-to-work benefits (such as gradual phasing out of income support, tax allowances 
and in-work benefits) and earnings disregards (income that is disregarded when it 
comes to assessing tax liability) complement ALMPs in making it more attractive to take 
a job. Taxing labour income is a prominent element of every Member State’s tax policy. 
So it is important to understand the underlying relationship between taxation and labour 
                                                 
25   A more sophisticated way of targeting programmes is through so-called profiling when statistical 
programmes are used to select which programme (if any) is expected to have the largest effect in 
reducing the length of periods of unemployment for a particular individual with given personal 
characteristics. The advantage of using statistical tools is that experience accumulated from all 
previous periods of unemployment can be used. See: Frölich, M., 2006, ‘Statistical treatment choice: 
an application to active labour market programmes’, IZA Discussion Paper, 2187. 
26    A contract setting out the rights and obligations between service providers and the participant 
empowers the individual and contributes to human capital development. Together with a benefit 
resembling a salary (i.e. taxable, dependent upon participation, extra work income from weekend 
work/evening work does not reduce the payments), it also improves motivation. The approach also sets 
out clear quality requirements and what the outcome should be. As such, the conditionality imposed 
goes both ways, increasing legitimacy and solidarity. It also facilitates monitoring of the quality and 
outcomes of the services rendered. .  
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supply. Evidence suggests that secondary earners are much more responsive to wages 
(and thus taxes) than primary earners. If the tax burden is too high, secondary earners 
might  decide they are better off not working, or (more rarely), working fewer 
hours.
27 Disincentives can also stem from joint taxation. 
Policy responses can only be effective if they take account of the fact that low-paid work 
and in-work poverty do not necessarily overlap.
28 Low-paid work is only one of the 
factors contributing to in-work poverty.
29 Thus, if the goal is to reduce in-work poverty, 
there is limited scope in using tax and benefit support on low-wage earners. Instead, 
targeting should focus on particular household types, chiefly single-earner households, or 
households with dependent children. 
In-work poverty is strongly associated with single-earners, or with secondary earners 
who are women that may want to work part time. So supporting the latter through 
childcare provisions for working parents would yield good results. 
•  Tax and benefit incentives should be primarily targeted towards low-income 
single-earner households, to encourage them to take full-time jobs. 
•  Offering tax and benefit allowances to families with children or dependents 
would raise the likelihood of parents taking jobs, reducing child poverty.    
2.3.  Access to enabling services 
The term ‘enabling services’ refers to various services essential to active, social, and 
economic inclusion policies. Social assistance services, employment and training 
services, housing support and social housing, childcare, long-term care services and 
health services
30 are all examples of such provision. 
There is evidence that publicly
31 provided services in education, health care, social 
housing, childcare, and elderly care, can do much to reduce poverty. They can also help 
to reduce inequality, thus reducing poverty across various groups. 
The impact of publicly provided services can be relevant for: 
                                                 
27   In the US, for every 10 % reduction in after-tax wages, primary earners work about 1 % fewer hours, 
for an elasticity of labour supply with respect to after-tax wages of 0.1. Secondary earners are much 
more responsive to wages (and thus taxes), with elasticities of labour supply with respect to after-tax 
wages estimated to range from 0.5 to 1. Source: Gruber (2011) Public finance and public policy, Third 
edition, Worth Publishers, pp. 628. 
28   Evidence suggests that the overlap is rather low — between 5 to 10 per cent in most industrialised 
economies Nolan, B. and Marx, I. 1999. ‘Low pay and household poverty’, Luxembourg Income 
Study, Working Paper, No 216. . 
29   See chapter on in-work poverty of European Commission (2011): Employment and Social 
Developments in Europe 2011. 
30   See Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2008 on the active inclusion of people excluded from the 
labour market (2008/867/EC published in the OJ L. 307/11 of 18.11.2008). . 
31   The evidence available is on publicly provided services (OECD-European Commission (2011): The 
impact of publicly provided services on the distribution of resources). This does not exclude the 
possibility that privately provided services can also have an important role in reducing poverty.  
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(1) children and the elderly because of their higher use of education and health services 
respectively; 
(2) single parents and couples with children, because of their higher use of education 
and childcare; 
(3) the unemployed, as they will benefit from employment and training services and 
(4) households with high work intensity. 
When it comes to service delivery, there is evidence that universal service provision 
faces fewer problems related to stigmatism compared to traditional, targeted social 
assistance benefits.
32 
 
2.3.1.  Investment in relevant services 
•  The specific poverty-alleviating effects of various services should always be borne 
in mind when planning reforms of service-providing systems. Investing in enabling 
services, including through Structural funds, and ensuring their accessibility and 
affordability and at the same time ensuring efficacy, can improve quality of life for 
different categories of disadvantaged people. 
2.3.2.  Personalised approach: high quality case handlers 
•  Structural funds, including the European Social Fund,
33 could be used to support 
quality training of case handlers to boost outreach to the most disadvantaged, for 
whom services can play a crucial support role. The type of support needed often 
depends on individual circumstances. High-quality case workers
34 can contribute 
significantly to job seekers successfully finding jobs. The Digital Agenda for Europe 
acknowledges the key role played by intermediaries and social actors and sets out 
different mechanisms to help them acquire digital knowledge and competences 
through the use of ICT.
 35 
2.4.  Cross-cutting policy areas 
Integrating the most relevant services with activation and income support would help 
hard-to-reach clients get access to the services they need. It would also reduce 
                                                 
32   Marx, I. (2010). Minimum income protection in post-industrial economies: on getting the balance right 
between incrementalism and innovation, in Social protection for a post-industrial world, ed. Kemp, P. 
A., International Studies on Social Security, vol. 15. 
33   See European Commission Staff Working Document - Social Investment through the European Social 
Fund,SWD(2013) 44. 
34   In the field of education, there is growing evidence that the quality of the teachers is an important 
factor in school performance. See at http://mckinseyonsociety.com/how-the-worlds-most-improved-
school-systems-keep-getting-better/. . 
35   See Gdansk Road Map for Digital inclusion: a Hub for Social Innovation, at:    
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/einclusion/docs/gdansk_roadmap.pdf.  
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administrative costs. Integration would be a step towards more effective, efficient social 
services, a prime example for social investment. 
•  Setting up ‘one-stop shops’ would simplify the organisation, delivery and take-up 
of services. This approach requires: 
–  integration of information systems to reduce duplication, provide the basis for a 
holistic, personalised approach to service delivery and help fight fraud; 
–  integration of employment services with social assistance services and enabling 
services; 
–  reducing the complexity of accessing services by simplifying eligibility 
requirements; 
–  improving coordination among different levels of government (central, regional 
or local) to improve overall service delivery. Cohesion funds could be used to 
improve administrative capacities at various levels of government; 
–  coordinating tax and benefits systems and looking at the impact of various 
programmes at the level of the individual. 
•  Participation of relevant stakeholders should be built into the design and 
evaluation of national active inclusion strategies in line with the 2008 
recommendation on active inclusion. 
3.  POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION AMONG PEOPLE OF WORKING AGE: MAIN 
DEVELOPMENTS AND COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
3.1.  Main trends since the Recommendation’s adoption 
Recent data on poverty and social inclusion suggest there were 120 million people at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion in the European Union in 2011, about 24 % of the 
population. The at-risk-of-poverty rate was especially high for children, lone parents and 
older workers. Nearly two-thirds (77 million) of this group were of working age. 
Between 2008 and 2011, those of working age
36 were most directly affected by the 
crisis and its impact on the job market and opportunities. Their risk of poverty and social 
exclusion rose in nearly two-thirds of EU countries and by 5 percentage points or more in 
the Baltic States, Spain, Ireland and Bulgaria. The apparent decrease or stability of the 
rate in countries that were seriously affected by the crisis (Portugal, Greece) is partly due 
to the counter-intuitive
37 stagnation or decrease in the relative poverty rate (see section 
below). 
                                                 
36   Working age is defined as individuals between 18 and 64. . 
37   If the median income decreases, that also lowers the poverty threshold, which is measured as 60 % of 
the median household income.  
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Chart 1: Share of working age (18-64) population at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion
38 (%); 2008-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat; EU-SILC (2011 income year 2010); except for IE (SILC 2010 income year 
2010). 
Poverty is primarily about living on a low income. The risk of poverty
39 among those of 
working age remained stable on average at EU level, but rose in nearly two-thirds of EU 
countries. The rise exceeded 2 percentage points in Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, and Spain. However, the data may underestimate the actual deterioration in 
living standards among the poorest in these countries, as well as in the countries that 
show smaller changes in the incidence of relative poverty, as explained below. 
                                                 
38   The indicator sums up the number of persons who are at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived 
or living in households with very low work intensity. Persons present in several sub-indicators are 
counted only once. Persons at risk of poverty have an equivalised disposable income below 60 % of 
the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers. Material deprivation covers 
indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Persons are considered to be living in households 
with very low work intensity if they are aged 0-59 and the working age members of the household 
worked less than 20 % of their potential during the past year. 
39   The at-risk-of poverty rate measures the share of people living with less than 60 % of the median 
income in their country. This is the threshold under which resources are considered too low to be able 
to fully participate in the society.  
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Chart 2a: Share of working age (18-64) population at risk of poverty (%); 2008-
2011 
 
Source: Eurostat; EU-SILC (2011 income year 2010); except for IE (SILC 2010 income year 
2010) 
 
Changes in relative poverty have to be interpreted together with trends in the poverty 
threshold. During the crisis, the general fall in incomes led to a significant drop, by 5 % 
or more, in the level of the poverty line (that is, the actual income of a person living on 
the poverty line) in Latvia, Ireland, Spain, Lithuania, Slovenia, Portugal and the UK. This 
indicates a sharp fall in the living standards of the poorest in these countries, including 
those in which the incidence of relative poverty remained stable. 
 
Chart 2b: Evolution of the at-risk of poverty threshold (% change between 2008 
and 2011) 
 
Source: Eurostat; EU-SILC (2011 income year 2010); except for IE (SILC 2010); at risk of 
poverty threshold in national currency (in Euro for CY and SK), deflated. 
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8.8 % of the EU-27 working age population suffered from severe material deprivation
40 
in 2011. As it is based on a single European threshold, this indicator reflects better the 
stark differences in living standards across the EU. In 2011, the severe material 
deprivation rate exceeded 30 % in Bulgaria and Latvia and exceeded 20 % in Hungary 
and Romania. The chart below shows the deterioration of the situation in the Member 
States among those most severely hit by the crisis. The deterioration was especially 
severe in Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Greece (at least 5 percentage points). 
 
Chart 3 Developments in severe material deprivation across EU Member States 
among the working age population (18-64), 2008-2011 
Source: Eurostat; EU-SILC (2011); except for IE (SILC 2010). Unlike income, material 
deprivation refers to the survey year. 
Exclusion from the labour market is another driver of poverty in the EU, especially in 
households where no-one holds a job. The crisis pushed many households out of the 
labour market, as shown in the chart below. Most Member States saw sharp rises in the 
rate of people living in jobless/very low work intensity households. The trends are 
particularly worrying in Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Bulgaria (over 4 percentage point 
deterioration between 2008 and 2011). 
                                                 
40   The severe material deprivation rate represents the proportion of people who cannot afford at least four 
of the nine following items: 1) (arrears on) mortgage or rent payments, utility bills, hire purchase 
instalments or other loan payments; 2) one week’s annual holiday away from home; 3) a meal with 
meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; 4) unexpected financial expenses; 5) a 
telephone (including mobile phone); 6) a colour TV; 7) a washing machine; 8) a car and 9) heating to 
keep the home adequately warm.  
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Chart 4 Developments in the share of people living in jobless households
41 across 
EU Member States, 18-59 (not students) 2008-2011 
Source: LFS 
Holding a job does not always protect a household from the risk of poverty. The working 
poor account for a third of adults of working age who are at risk of poverty. In 2011, 
almost 9 % of those with jobs were living under the poverty threshold. In-work poverty 
rose significantly in a third of EU countries (MT, DK, CY, IE, FR, IT, ES, and RO) 
between 2008 and 2011. In-work poverty applies to situations in which there are not 
enough adults working in a household, or where they are not working enough hours to 
earn a living. It is also linked to poor labour market conditions such as low pay, low 
skills, precarious employment and under-employment. Single-parent households and 
single households in which the breadwinner is not working full time, as well as single-
income families face the highest risks of poverty (often these being women or young 
people). 
                                                 
41   Share of people living in a household where no one is working.  
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Chart 5 Developments in the level of in-work poverty across EU Member States 
among the working age population (18-64), 2008-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat; EU-SILC (2011); except for IE (SILC 2010). 
 
Social transfers play an essential role in providing support to both those that are without 
jobs, and those that are transitioning into the labour market (and may face low-paying 
jobs). Their impact in reducing the risk of poverty of those of working age varies greatly 
across EU countries, from less than 25 % of the risk of poverty before social transfers in 
BG, EL, and IT, to more than 50 % in BE, IE, DK, FI, SE, HU, NL, LU, and AT. These 
variations reflect differences in levels of poverty before social transfers, in levels of 
spending, and in the design of taxes and benefits systems. During the crisis, the impact of 
social transfers has increased in nearly half of EU Member States, including some of 
those worst hit by the crisis. 
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Chart 6 Impact of social transfers (not pensions) in reducing the risk of poverty of 
the working age population, 2008-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat; EU-SILC (2011); except for IE (SILC 2010), DG EMPL calculation. Impact of 
social transfers is calculated as the relative change in the at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after 
social transfers. 
 
3.2.  Grouping countries according to their main challenges 
 
Poverty and social exclusion among those of working age are driven by multiple factors, 
including exclusion from the labour market, insufficient earnings from work for the 
employed and his/her family and inadequate income support for those who need it. 
Different factors prevail in different countries. A cluster analysis based on five 
indicators
42 of the main drivers can group countries according to the main challenges 
they face. It shows that countries that perform well on all drivers have good outcomes 
and relatively less poverty, while those that show bad performance on one or more 
drivers have the worst outcomes. 
Table 1. Clustering of MS based on the following drivers: jobless households, long-
term unemployment (LTU) rate, impact of social transfers on poverty reduction, 
activity rate, in-work poverty, and related poverty outcomes 
 
  Drivers Outcome  Countries 
                                                 
42 The five indicators are jobless households, long-term unemployment rate, impact of social transfers on 
poverty reduction, activity rate, and in-work poverty. These indicators are also those used in the Joint 
Assessment Framework to assess the policy area ‘active inclusion’.  
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Group A 
 
 Low share of jobless households 
Low level of long term unemployment 
Impact of social transfers is high 
Relatively high level of activity rate 
Low level of in-work poverty 
Risk of Poverty 
Poverty gap 
Persistent poverty 
CZ FR  
NL AT SI 
SE 
(CY) 
Group B 
Relatively high share of jobless 
households 
 Low level of long term unemployment 
Impact of social transfers is high 
Relatively high level of activity rate (BE) 
Low level of in-work poverty 
 Risk of Poverty 
 Poverty gap 
 Persistent poverty 
BE DK DE 
FI UK 
Group C 
Very high share of jobless 
households 
Very high level of long term 
unemployment 
Impact of social transfers is high 
Low level of activity rate 
Relatively low level of in work poverty 
Risk of Poverty 
Poverty gap 
 
IE 
Group 
D 
 Relatively high share of jobless 
households 
Low level of long term unemployment 
Impact of social transfers is very 
low 
Very low level of activity rate 
 Relatively high level of in-work poverty 
Risk of Poverty 
Poverty gap 
Persistent poverty 
BG RO 
HU PL 
IT MT  
Group E 
 Relatively high share of jobless 
households 
Very high level of long term 
unemployment 
Impact of social transfers is low 
Relatively high level of activity rate 
High level of in-work poverty 
Risk of 
Poverty 
Poverty gap 
Persistent poverty 
ES EL PT 
LV LT EE 
SK 
 
      
Source: EU-SILC 2010, and EU LFS 2011, European Commission (DG EMPL) calculation. Groups are 
obtained by cluster analysis based on five variables for the working age population: share of the population 
living in zero or very low work intensity households, long-term unemployment rate, impact of social 
transfers in reducing poverty, activity rate and in work poverty rate. Country scores are calculated with 
reference to the EU average. 
Notes: LU is treated as a ‘shadow country’ not influencing the clustering, since it presents outlier values. 
Countries in brackets are to be considered as on the edge of the cluster. 
Group A includes CZ, FR, NL, AT, SI, SE, and (CY) characterised by fewer people 
excluded from the labour market, low levels of in-work poverty and above-average 
impact of social transfers. They are among the countries with the least poverty among 
those of working age.  
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Group B includes BE, DK, DE, FI and the UK. These countries are quite similar to 
group A, but have more people living in jobless households. They are among countries 
with the least poverty for those of working age, though rates are slightly higher than for 
group A. 
Group C singles out Ireland, characterised by a very high number of people living in 
jobless households and low activity rates, combined with social transfers that have a high 
impact on reducing poverty. Ireland combines a relatively high risk of poverty with a low 
poverty gap. 
Group D includes BG, IT, HU, MT, PL and RO which combine low activity rates, low 
impact of social transfers and a medium to high number of people in jobless households 
and in-work poverty. They are among countries with a medium to high risk of poverty 
for those of working age. 
Group E includes the Baltic States, ES, PT, EL and SK which combine high levels of 
long-term unemployment, average activity rates, social transfers with a low impact and a 
medium to high number of people in jobless households and in-work poverty. They are 
among countries with a high incidence and persistence of poverty for those of working 
age. 
This clustering is used throughout this document to assess the performance of Member 
States, based on indicators relevant for the three pillars of active inclusion. 
4.  REVIEW OF ACTIVE INCLUSION STRATEGIES AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
4.1.  Adequate income support
43 
The 1992 Council Recommendation on sufficient resources
 44 called on Member States to 
recognise the individual’s right to sufficient resources and to provide adequate income 
support, based on an evaluation of the resources necessary for a life in dignity. Such 
support should be combined with an availability to work and the system should avoid 
creating inactivity traps. 
Minimum income schemes are central among the range of measures in place across the 
EU, given that they are non-contributory safety nets of last resort. This review shows 
persistent differences among Member States as regards the level of coverage. There are 
also challenges in reaching those experiencing the worst forms of poverty, for instance, 
the homeless. The evidence suggests that one of the issues is the number of people who 
do not take up schemes for which they are eligible. Minimum income schemes alone are 
in any case insufficient to lift beneficiaries out of poverty. They intervene as a last resort 
and generally interact with other benefits schemes.  
 
Adequate income support aims to ensure that those who do not have enough of their 
own resources to live in a manner compatible with human dignity may do so, whether or 
not they are fit for work. That is consistent with the 1992 Council Recommendation 
which called on Member States to recognise such a basic right. 
                                                 
43   This section is based on the partial reproduction of the Joint report on social protection and social 
inclusion 2010, pages 54-65 (European Commission, 2010). 
44   Council Recommendation of 24 June 1992 on common criteria concerning sufficient resources and 
social assistance in social protection systems (92/441/EEC).  
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In assessing adequate income support, it is important to distinguish between two levels 
of safety net for the working age population. 
The first level of safety net is mainly
45 represented by the unemployment benefit 
system. Most people who lose their jobs usually receive some form of unemployment 
benefit in the first instance. Well-designed insurance-based unemployment benefit 
systems with broad coverage should in principle limit the need for last-resort schemes. 
Spending on unemployment benefits is also quite significant in overall spending on 
social protection. 
The first level of safety nets is reviewed regarding the coverage, adequacy and labour 
market friendliness (presence/absence of financial disincentives) of benefits (see 
Annex, Table 1). 
Group A and Group B (as defined in section 2.2) include the countries that do well in 
terms of coverage, generosity, and duration in the first level of safety nets (with the 
exception of UK and CY). High generosity, however, comes with higher disincentives to 
return to the labour market (higher than average unemployment traps
46). 
At the other end of the spectrum, countries belonging to groups D and E (eastern and 
southern European countries) are characterised by low coverage, low generosity, low 
duration, and benefit systems with low disincentives. Without a strong first-line safety 
net system, the bulk of the burden falls on last-resort schemes, such as social assistance.     
The second level of safety nets complements the first one. It is based on various benefit 
systems, mainly minimum income schemes. They are designed for those who are not 
eligible for unemployment benefit or other forms of replacement income, though they 
may have previously been so. These schemes can play an important role at times of 
prolonged economic downturn, as growing numbers of the unemployed become 
ineligible to collect unemployment benefits. 
Both levels are reviewed in relation to the coverage, adequacy, and labour market 
friendliness (financial disincentives to work) of benefits (see Annex, Table 1). The 
patterns are similar to those seen for the first level of safety nets: Scandinavian and 
Benelux countries as well as AT, CZ, FR and DE have more comprehensive safety nets 
(high coverage, generosity), but also higher disincentives to return to work (higher than 
average inactivity traps
47), while, in general, eastern and southern European countries 
have safety nets characterised by low coverage and generosity, but lower disincentives to 
work. 
Thus, countries in groups D and E do not have adequate safety nets, whether at first or 
second level. These countries face significant difficulties in addressing the social 
consequences of a serious economic downturn. 
                                                 
45   Disability and sickness benefits are not included here. 
46   The  unemployment trap — or the implicit tax on returning to work for unemployed persons — 
measures the part of the additional gross wage that is taxed away in the form of increased taxes and 
withdrawn benefits such as unemployment benefits, social assistance and housing benefits when a 
person returns to work from unemployment. 
47   The inactivity trap — or the implicit tax on returning to work for inactive persons — measures the part 
of additional gross wage that is taxed away in the case where an inactive person (not entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits but eligible for income-tested social assistance) takes up a job. In other words, 
this indicator measures the financial incentives to move from inactivity and social assistance to 
employment.  
26 
In the remainder of this section, the focus is primarily on minimum income (MI) 
schemes for people of working age given that active inclusion aims at people furthest 
from the labour market (potentially the main group to benefit from such schemes of last 
resort).
48 The focus on working age is due to the strong labour market reintegration 
component of the strategy. Minimum income schemes provide cash benefits to ensure a 
minimum standard of living for individuals (and their dependants) that have either no 
other means of financial support, or whose resources fall short of a given level, despite 
including contributory cash benefits and support from other family members. MI 
schemes are considered as ‘schemes of last resort.’ They provide a safety net to protect 
people from destitution if they are not eligible for social insurance benefits, or are no 
longer entitled to such benefits. They play an even more important role in a crisis, 
when the rise in unemployment has already had an impact on social assistance schemes.
49 
Almost all EU countries have some form of MI scheme at national level. Member 
States that do not have one, such as Italy, have some sort of scheme at regional or local 
level. These are generally conceived as a short-term form of assistance, though in most 
Member States, they are not formally time-limited. They are means-tested and funded 
through the tax system (i.e. non-contributory). They are intended mainly for people out 
of work, but some Member States (CY, DE, LT, FR, PT, RO, SI, SE and IE) have 
extended their scope to provide in-work income support. 
 
4.1.1.  Institutional features of minimum income schemes in EU countries 
In most Member States, MI schemes are designed at national level, while delivery is 
delegated to the local authorities.
50 An examination of various national definitions
51 
shows that most Member States use a statutory minimum level of income, fixed by the 
(national, regional, local) legislator or government. Further classifications are possible 
along territorial arrangements, type of benefits (cash vs. in-kind), and existence of top-
ups (or income tapers). Minimum income benefits in general are adjusted periodically.
52 
In none of the Member States is the minimum income level linked to national minimum 
wage.   
                                                 
48  The analysis presented in this section relies on the work conducted by the EU Network of national 
independent experts on social inclusion, and particularly on the Synthesis Report drawn from their 
work (Frazer H. and E. Marlier (2009) ‘Minimum income schemes across EU Member States. 
Synthesis Report’). 
49   Social assistance (SA) schemes represent the broader category including MI benefits together with 
other types of benefits such as housing benefits, child benefits and unemployment assistance benefits. 
50   In a few Member States, like Austria and Hungary, responsibility for policy decisions on SA benefit 
levels and eligibility conditions is partly delegated to regional/local governments. 
51   MISSOC Analysis (2011). Guaranteed Minimum Resources, MISSOC Secretariat for the European 
Commission, Contract nr. VC/2010/1131. 
52   Most Member States do automatic adjustments following changes in the consumer price index (in 
some countries an increase will only take place if the consumer index is raised by a certain percentage 
(CZ, LU, BE)). Some Member States will only adjust at irregular intervals after a decision by the 
government (LT, EE), while in other countries this will depend on the available budgetary resources 
(BG, LV). However, the periodicity of adjustment varies from every 6 months (SI, NL), to each year 
(almost all Member States), up to once every 3 years (PL), or at irregular intervals (LT, EE). Source: 
MISSOC Analysis 2011.  
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The design of MI schemes varies widely among Member States. In terms of 
comprehensiveness (i.e. the extent to which MI schemes are non-categorical, thus 
applying to those on low incomes in general, rather than to specific subgroups), four 
‘broad’ groups of countries can be distinguished.
53 
-  Group 1 (AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, FI, NL, PT, RO, SI, SE) is characterised by 
relatively simple and comprehensive MI schemes, generally open to those without 
sufficient means to live in dignity. 
-  Group 2 is smaller (EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, SK). It has simple and non-categorical
54 
MI schemes accompanied by more restricted eligibility conditions. 
-  Group 3 (ES, FR,
55 IE, MT, UK) is characterised by a complex set of different and 
often categorical schemes that sometimes overlap but generally cover most of those 
with insufficient means. 
-  Finally, there is a small group of countries with limited, partial or piecemeal 
arrangements only covering narrow categories of people (BG, IT, EL). 
Eligibility conditions (commonly related to age, nationality, residence, lack of financial 
resources and availability for work) vary significantly. In some Member States, where 
there are only piecemeal and categorical schemes, there are people on very low incomes 
that do not have access to any form of MI scheme. 
Over the past years many Member States have tightened eligibility conditions.
56 
Conditionality has generally been increased and availability for work has usually been 
more tightly enforced for those are fit to work. There are often sanctions if beneficiaries 
fail to comply with the requirement that they must be available for work. Sanctions may 
lead to reductions in benefits, and to the loss of the right to SA benefits in more extreme 
cases. There is also a trend towards a stronger link between income support through MI 
schemes and activation measures including vocational training, job search assistance, 
and counselling. 
MI schemes are of unlimited duration in all Member States. They are granted for as long 
as a person is in need of support, and need is monitored by regular checks that 
beneficiaries do indeed fulfil eligibility conditions. National MI schemes differ as regards 
the duration for which benefits are available after each application, so the frequency with 
which a claimant has to reapply varies. For example, in FR the Revenu de solidarité 
active (RSA) has to be renewed after three months, in BG, SI and LV after six months, 
while in PT, the period is 12 months.
57 
                                                 
53   Frazer H. and E. Marlier (2009) ‘Minimum income schemes across EU Member States. Synthesis 
Report’ . 
54    Access to categorical benefits is restricted based on some personal characteristics (single, with 
children, etc.) non-categorical benefits are benefits with no restriction based on personal 
characteristics. . 
55   This has improved with the introduction of the Revenu de solidarité active in 2009. 
56   A follow-up survey, conducted in autumn 2011 and spring 2012, on the implementation of the active 
inclusion strategies at national level (based on pre-filled questionnaires complemented by MS 
information) found that more countries have implemented stricter eligibility criteria for minimum 
income (CZ, FR HU, PT, RO, UK) compared to those that relaxed eligibility (MT, LT) in the 
examined period (2008-2012). 
57   MISSOC database for 2011.  
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Considering overall income support, it should be noted that in some Member States, MI 
claimants also receive additional assistance for specific needs, such as housing 
benefits, contributions to fuel costs and means-tested child benefits. Though not formally 
classified as ‘guaranteed MI benefits’ these do contribute to the level of income that is 
actually guaranteed to people supported by MI schemes. 
4.1.2.  The non-take up of benefits: estimated extent, causes and policy-
relevant consequences 
Coverage of MI schemes is defined on the basis of eligibility criteria. The take-up of 
benefits refers to the share of those entitled to benefits that actually receive them. 
Coverage and take-up rates do not necessarily match,
58 and the available evidence
59 
shows that the gap between the two is significant, sometimes very large. 
Hernanz et al. (2004) report estimates of take-up for social assistance and housing 
benefits ranging between 40 % and 80 %. A more recently completed EUROMOD project 
(AIM-AP)
60 has provided additional evidence for some EU countries and different types 
of benefit. It reports ranges between 33 % and 88 %.
61 
The UK is the only EU Member State which has published official estimates of take-up 
rates for various benefits, including Income Support, since 1997, but its last estimates 
refer to 2007-08. Evidence from an evaluation of the French RSA scheme highlights that 
many beneficiaries do not receive the support and activation to which they are entitled, 
with a non-take up rate of 35 % for basic benefits (RSA socle) and up to 68 % for the in-
work RSA supplement (RSA activité).
62 
Overall, take-up seems to have declined, at least for some of the EU countries for which 
data are available. Some groups may be more likely not to take up benefits than 
others.
63 
                                                 
58   In an ideal scenario where all people entitled to benefits actually receive them, coverage and take-up 
rates would be identical. In practice ‘frictions’ of different nature generate incomplete take-up, so that 
take-up rates end up being smaller than coverage rates. 
59   Evidence on take-up is currently very fragmented and limited in terms of country coverage. It is often 
out of date, and refers to different schemes for different countries. 
60   The Accurate Income Measurement for the Assessment of Public Policies was a project (started in 
2006 and finished in 2009) funded by the European Commission under the Sixth Research Framework 
Programme. AIM-AP aimed at improving the comparability, scope and applicability of tools, methods 
and data for the measurement of income and the analysis of the effects of policies on inequality, 
poverty and social inclusion. It involved 11 universities and research institutes in various EU countries 
(http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/research-and-policy-analysis-using-euromod/aim-ap). . 
61   Source: Matsaganis M., A. Paulus and H. Sutherland (2008) ‘The take up of social benefits’ SSO 
Research Note 6(2008). 
62    Commission Staff Working Document, Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and 
stability programme for France, SWD(2012) 313 final, Comité National d’Evaluation Rapport Final, 
December 2011. 
63   EU Network of Independent Experts (Frazer and Marlier, 2009) For instance, in Belgium non-take up 
is estimated to be greater for women, couples, individuals with educational attainment below the 
second stage of secondary studies and the 16-24 age cohort. In the UK, people that do not take up 
Income Support tend to be slightly older than those that take it up (with a larger share of people aged 
50-59) and more likely to be owner-occupiers in terms of tenure type, to have other incomes, to share 
their household with other benefit units and to live in a household below 60 % of median income 
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The reasons for this vary widely. Information costs, administrative costs, disincentives 
(due to low benefit levels and short duration), social and psychological costs, errors in 
evaluation procedures and discretionary assessment may be among the explanations.
64 
In any case, the evidence clearly shows that a considerable number of people do not take 
up benefits. The reasons for this require research efforts and attention from policy-
makers, because: 
•  low take-up distorts the intended effects of social benefits and reduces the 
chances of programmes achieving their objectives. Non-take-up lowers the 
capacity of SA to reduce the at-risk-of-poverty rate and widens the poverty gap.
65 
•  if a benefit is not claimed because of reasons such as lack of information, this 
creates  disparities in the way potential claimants are treated in a welfare 
programme supposed to treat them equally.
66 
 
4.1.3.  Minimum income schemes: the issue of adequacy 
In most Member States, for most types of household, minimum income benefits alone 
are not enough to lift people out of being at risk of poverty. Chart 6 shows the level of 
net social assistance as a percentage of the median household income in the EU 
countries. There are wide differences across Member States: on the one hand, DK, IE, 
and the NL have social assistance support (including housing) above 70 % of the median 
household income, while on the other, RO, PT, and BG all have social assistance support 
below 30 % of that level. 
                                                                                                                                                 
before housing costs (DWP, 2009). Some of the EU Network experts, the Austrian for instance, 
underline the fact that non-take up can vary significantly by region within a country (Frazer and 
Marlier, 2009). 
64   Hernanz V., F. Malherbet and M. Pellizzari (2004) ‘Take-up of welfare benefits in OECD countries: a 
review of the evidence’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2004)2. 
65   Matsaganis et al. (2008) . 
66   (Hernanz et al., 2004).  
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Chart 7. The level of net social assistance as a percentage of median household 
equivalised income in EU-27,
67 Single household, 2010 
 
Source: Eurostat, OECD. 
 
Mechanisms for raising MI benefits over time are important to ensure they are adequate. 
There has been a tendency towards benefits failing to keep pace with general living 
standards, and to lose ground relative to wage increases over time.
68 This is often linked 
to the lack of clear systems and procedures for regular reviewing of the level of 
MI.
69 
Measuring ‘adequacy’ is problematic. Setting the monetary poverty threshold at 60 % of 
median income does not reflect variations in consumption patterns and the cost of living 
across a given country. As an alternative, the reference budget (standard) method 
defines poverty thresholds with reference to a basket of goods and services that are 
considered necessary to reach an acceptable standard of living within a given 
country or region. Once agreed, the basket is valued using detailed price data. 
Table 2 illustrates reference budget methods in the UK, NL, IE and BE (Flanders), 
reflecting the sums needed to cover basic necessities, defined as food, clothing, fuel and 
rent. The methods also estimate an amount for other goods and services considered 
necessary to lead a decent life (e.g. transport, communication, heath care, personal care, 
education, etc.). In three methods (UK, BE, IE), the total is an amount close to or above 
60 % of median income threshold. In NL, the method produces a much more 
parsimonious basket. This shows that efforts to define the set of goods and services 
that are absolutely necessary to escape poverty, even following strict methodological 
                                                 
67   Italy and Cyprus excluded (no data available). 
68   This reflects the more general downward trend for social assistance benefits standardised for wage 
increases between 1990 and 2005, Nelson K. (2009) ‘Social assistance and minimum income 
protection in the EU: vulnerability, adequacy, and convergence’ Luxembourg Income Study Working 
Paper No 511. 
69   See Frazer and Marlier, 2009, and the country reports produced by the EU Network of independent 
experts for the country-specific institutional details on this.  
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guidelines,  will always involve significant normative assumptions leading to 
substantial differences in the amounts estimated. 
Table 2: Reference budget examples for a single person of working age 
UK Minimum 
Income 
Standard 
2008
Netherlands 
NIBUD budget 
2008 
Ireland 
Vincentian 
2006 
Flanders CSB 
2008
Food 2.499 1.761 2.949 1.604
Clothing 473 522 723 414
Fuel 558 881 327 1.107
Rent 3.240 3.403 2.921 4.169
Total necessities 6.770 6.566 6.921 7.294
Total budget 13.018 8.599 15.039 10.129
Relative threshold  11.126 11.485 10.901
10.046
(Belgium)
€ppp per year 2007 prices
€ppp per year 2008
 
Source: ‘The measurement of extreme poverty’ — European Commission (2011) and EU-SILC 
(ilc_li01) 
 
4.2.  Inclusive labour market measures 
By inviting Member States to put in place more inclusive labour markets, the 
Recommendation called on them to support access and return to employment through 
active labour market policies. These policies include lifelong learning, personalised 
support and guidance that meet the needs of those furthest from employment, while 
ensuring quality jobs, promoting job retention and enabling advancement. Providing such 
support has become increasingly challenging as jobs losses have disproportionately 
affected jobs offering middle income and lower middle income. 
Most Member States have moved towards active welfare policies in which income 
support is granted, on condition that the recipient is actively involved in looking for 
work. Yet active labour market measures (such as profiling, job counselling, educational 
training and re-qualification) still account for only a small proportion of expenditure on 
the labour market across the EU, especially in eastern Member States. And while many 
Member States have taken steps to tackle financial disincentives to work (for instance, 
through back-to-work benefits and disregarding a portion of earnings when setting tax 
liability), in-work poverty remains a major concern, standing at a rate of 9.4 %. Social 
enterprises and the social economy in general have already proven their capacity to 
provide innovative responses to the current economic and social challenges by 
developing sustainable, largely non-exportable jobs, social inclusion, and improvement 
of local social services. 
 
Assessment of the second pillar of active inclusion (inclusive labour markets) is based on 
a series of indicators reflecting the labour market friendliness of tax and benefits 
systems,  the level of labour market segmentation, the level of participation in 
activation measures, and the design and level of expenditures on ALMPs (see Annex, 
Table 2). These indicators also reflect various aspects of the phenomenon of in-work 
poverty. 
Minimum wages often act as a ceiling for minimum income support. As such, a 
comparison of minimum wages to the poverty threshold (60 % of the national median 
household income) gives an idea on the adequacy of minimum wages. The data show 
wide variations. In the UK, NL and IE, the minimum wage is significantly above the  
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poverty threshold. On the other hand, in EE, SI, HU, and SK, minimum wages are 
significantly below it. Very low minimum wages also effectively risk creating inactivity 
traps. 
Support for activation is stronger in groups A (CZ, FR, NL, AT, SE, and CY), B (i.e. 
BE,
70 DK, DE, FI), and C (IE), than in D (BG, IT, HU, MT, PL, and RO), and E (i.e. the 
Baltic States, EL, and SK). It appears therefore that countries that, overall, have better 
performing social protection systems also have more comprehensive ALMPs. Transition 
out of poverty is also higher for northern and western European countries and lower in 
the east and south. 
Back-to-work benefits and earnings disregards make taking a job more viable. 
Inadequate coordination of the tax and benefits system may lead to a low-wage trap
71 
that can create disincentives when a worker is trying to increase productivity. This 
phenomenon is more severe in group B (BE DK DE FI and the UK) for single-wage 
households and in group D (IT, HU, MT, and PL) for second-income earners. 
 
4.2.1.  The working poor in the EU
72 
In-work poverty refers to a situation in which having a job does not enable a person and 
his/her family to escape poverty. Though employment is seen as the best way of doing 
so, there are those who are working and are still at risk of poverty. Access to employment 
is not enough to improve their situation. 
The main factors behind in-work poverty can be grouped under four categories: 
1) family/household composition, low work intensity and low wage; 
2) individual/personal characteristics;   
3) institutional factors (i.e. duration and type of contract, minimum wage, tax and social 
protection); 
4) structure of economy/labour market. 
Low work intensity
73 and low wages contribute most to in-work poverty.
74 In general, 
countries with high at-risk-of-poverty rates have high in-work poverty rates and vice-
                                                 
70   While BE has high spending and participation on ALMPs, due to improper design, the activation 
system seems to be ineffective. 
71   The low-wage trap is defined as the rate at which taxes are increased and benefits withdrawn as 
earnings rise due to an increase in work productivity. This kind of trap is most likely to occur at 
relatively low wage levels due to the fact that the withdrawal of social transfers (mainly social 
assistance, in-work benefits and housing benefits), which are usually available only to persons with a 
low income, adds to the marginal rate of income taxes and social security contributions. 
72   Based on European Commission Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2011(ESDE 2011) 
and 2012 (ESDE 2012) and on European Commission Staff Working Document - Evidence on 
Demographic and Social Trends, SWD(2013) 38. 
73   People living in households with very low work intensity are defined as people of all ages (0-59 years) 
living in households where the adults (those aged 18-59, but excluding students aged 18-24) worked 
less than 20 % of their total combined work-time potential during the previous 12 months (EU SILC 
definition). . 
74   ESDE 2011. Pg. 153.  
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versa. In-work poverty rates tend to be highest for single parents with dependent 
children. Rates are much higher for those on temporary contracts or working part-
time. The tax rate for low-wage workers has increased in recent years, though with wide 
variations across Member States. Lack of access to services, such as childcare, which 
forces women to opt for part-time work, can also cause in-work poverty. 
The more members of a household there are in work, the lower the risk of poverty. Thus, 
the one-breadwinner family household, in which work intensity is low to medium, is not 
protected from the risk of poverty. In fact, across the EU, the risk for such households is 
between 15 % and 50 %. For almost half the adult population and most households in the 
EU, work intensity is high to very high (80 %-100 %). Next come households with 
medium work intensity (40 %-60 %) covering nearly 20 % of all adults. This is the type of 
household involving 25 % of adults in southern Member States (ES, IT, MT, ES), where 
female participation in the labour market is low. By contrast, in DK only 10 % of adults 
live in medium work intensity households. 
Single parents and children are particularly exposed to in-work poverty. If there are 
children in a household, this directly affects the risk of poverty, as total income has to be 
shared among more people. However, in most Member States, very high work intensity 
can reduce the risk of poverty affecting children. This is not the case for BG, EE, LT, PL, 
PT and ES. This may be due to low levels of child benefit and wages. In DE, however, 
the risk of poverty for families with children is similar to that of the same type of 
household in DK, despite lower work intensity (usually medium). This highlights the 
need for good family support at different levels of work intensity. As in DE, most 
families in ES and IT are medium work intensity households. In ES and IT, however, 
only high work intensity seems to alleviate the risk of poverty, mainly because of higher 
wages and largely due to lack of family support. 
Low wages have an impact on in-work poverty because they affect individual and 
household income. There is a danger that low-wage temporary employment, especially 
among young people, may become a persistent feature of working life. Among the self-
employed, wages have gone down considerably because of the crisis. 
Women, young people, older workers, migrants and the low-skilled are more at risk 
of in-work poverty than other groups. Across the EU, the in-work poverty risk for men is 
higher than for women. This may be because women tend to be second-income earners 
(thereby better protected) and have actually gained employment in a medium-to-higher 
paid wage structure during the recession. Yet, single mothers and single women are 
particularly at risk of in-work poverty compared to others. There is no strong correlation 
between age and in-work poverty. Young people tend to be more vulnerable if they live 
by themselves, or if they hold a student job or ‘mini job’ (e.g. in DK, SE). 
In-work poverty is highest for people working less than a full year, followed by those 
in temporary contracts or in part-time employment. Apart from IE, MT and UK, all 
Member States have in-work poverty rates for those on temporary contracts that are 
almost double those seen in permanent employment. Only in IE, MT, UK and DK does 
in-work poverty prevail in permanent employment. Young people, migrants and those in 
low-skilled labour are most likely to be on temporary contracts. For instance, in Poland, 
those on temporary contracts account for up to 26.8 % of total employment, working in 
jobs with a wage penalty of 27.8 % relative to permanent contracts. These factors tend to 
trap people in poorly-paid jobs and hamper upward mobility. In Spain, the in-work  
34 
poverty rate for temporary workers is four times higher than for permanent workers.
75 
Those on temporary contracts would usually prefer to be on permanent contracts, so the 
temporary aspect is involuntary, except in DK and AT. Involuntary part-time work is a 
growing issue in many countries, such as DE, where wider use of non-standard contracts 
has increased flexibility on the labour market, but also led to further inequalities among 
workers.
76 
 
4.2.2.  Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) for the people furthest from 
the labour market
77 
Shared characteristics of ALMPs in Member States are profiling, job counselling, 
educational training and (re-)qualification.
78 Subsidised employment, public work 
programmes, short-term paid employment, traineeships and voluntary work are among 
ways of reintegrating people into work. While all Member States have policies for the 
unemployed and job seekers generally, the degree to which these target those who are 
furthest from the labour market (e.g. social assistance recipients) varies substantially. 
However, some Member States (BE, DE, AT, FI, LU, PL, SI) specifically target these 
recipients by means of separate programmes. 
 
ALMPs
79 account for only a small share of Member States’ GDP in the EU-27 (0.85 % of 
the GDP on average), and these policies are mostly financed through unemployment 
insurance funds. DK, BE, NL, and SE had the highest share of ALMP spending in 2010. 
Sometimes ALMPs go hand in hand with passive labour market policies,
80 as in DK, 
providing an effective tool for both protection and activation, though passive policies 
have much a more prominent role in ES and BE. Most eastern European countries spend 
little (see the chart below) on labour market policies, whether active or passive. There 
has been no significant rise in funding for ALMPs in recent years. 
 
                                                 
75    Commission Staff Working Document, Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and 
convergence programme for Poland and Spain, SWD(2012) 323 final, SWD(2012) 310 final. 
76    Commission Staff Working Document, Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and 
stability programme for Germany, SWD(2012) 305 final. 
77   Unless indicated otherwise, based on the Active Inclusion Country Surveys 2008-2011. . 
78   For a classification by type of action see Eurostat (2010). Labour market policy — expenditure and 
participants.    
79    In EU ALMPs include labour market services, training, job rotation and sharing, employment 
incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, and start-up incentives. 
80   Passive labour market policies include various unemployment benefits and early retirement.  
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Chart 8: Active and passive labour market policies expenditure in percentage of 
GDP, 2009 
Source: Eurostat LMP database, 2010 
Among the unemployed and recipients of social assistance and activation policies, 
Member States identify different sub-targets for ALPMs, among which young and older 
workers, low-skilled and long-term unemployed, migrants and people with 
disabilities. For example, IE targets older workers, while the UK targets young people 
within the Jobseeker’s Allowance scheme. DK and SE have separate schemes for older 
workers and young unemployed people. Measures currently in place in DE, SK, SI and 
ES tend to focus on the long-term unemployed. Few efforts are made to provide special 
support to integrate migrants into the labour market, although Vienna is a notable 
exception. 
An overwhelming majority of Member States
81 link the right to income support to the 
willingness to work and a minimum commitment to seeking a job, vocational or 
occupational training. In SK, proving one’s willingness to work and to accept a suitable 
job is only compulsory when applying for the highest level of income support benefit.
82 
The conditions under which job seekers have to accept a job offer varies across Member 
States. In CZ and DE, job seekers are required to accept any job, even if it is short-term, 
or a mismatch with their skills. In LV, EE, SK, MT and NL, job seekers are obliged to 
accept suitable work only (subject to the relevant authority’s assessment). 
If a job seeker is unable to find work, most Member States offer vocational or 
occupational training. Some also provide various counselling services which can cover 
advice to manage debt or addiction or psychological support (DE) during drug or alcohol 
rehabilitation (MT). In SI, job seekers may have to sign a contract with the Social Work 
Centre to take part in social and/or health programmes (SI). In other countries such as 
LU, an ‘integration allowance’ is available only if job seekers take part in an ‘integration 
activity’. 
If occupational or vocational training is not successful, some public administrations 
provide (mandatory) measures to ensure activation (NO, RO, BG, NL, LV, HU). This 
may mean compulsory involvement in public works (e.g. providing social services, 
cleaning). This dimension should in many cases be complemented by improving job 
                                                 
81   MISSOC Analysis (2011). Guaranteed Minimum Resources, MISSOC Secretariat for the European 
Commission, Contract nr. VC/2010/1131 .Pg 17. 
82   MISSOC Analysis (2011).  
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seekers’ prospects of finding work, to avoid locking them into such schemes (LV, HU).
83 
In NL, a young person who is not in employment or education (NEET) has the right to 
request a job or an offer of a place in education from the local municipality.
84 
‘Reluctant behaviours or attitudes’ such as refusing a job offer or refusing to take part in 
ALMPs are generally penalised by sanctions. These vary, and include withdrawal of 
benefits and grants (e.g. in EE, SI, LT, CZ, EE), withdrawal of benefits (e.g. BG, CY, 
HU), suspension of benefits (e.g. LT, DK) or lowering the level of benefits (LV, IE). 
 
Box 1: Recent activation measures in Ireland 
The main types of measures introduced are: 
•  active case management and profiling services for recipients of benefits of 
working age (Department of Social Protection); 
•  reform and consolidation of job-placement services and related provisions for 
the unemployed in the Department of Social Protection and effective separation 
between job placement and training provision (the latter has been moved to the 
Department of Education and Skills); 
•  scaling up, targeting and further diversifying the training and work experience 
available. Community Employment is a new scheme that offers places as part of 
the response to the crisis, and a new job creation programme, the Community 
Work Placement Initiative (Tús), has been rolled out, both noteworthy 
developments. 
‘FAS’ employment services and the Community Welfare Service have been integrated 
into the Department of Social Protection in a restructuring of the way different 
departments operate, focused solely on labour market activation. 
(Source: Irish expert’s report)
85 
 
As a response to the economic crisis, most governments recognise the need to step up 
efforts to develop measures tailored to specific vulnerable groups, notably the young, 
older unemployed people, and women. The main priorities for ALMPs in NRPs are 
expanding educational measures (including on-the-job and vocational training) to reduce 
skills mismatches, expanding and improving job (search) counselling for the unemployed 
to improve the matching process, and tax reforms that benefit low-wage earners to 
support labour market participation even during high unemployment, as implemented 
recently by e.g. AT and LU. 
 
                                                 
83    Commission Staff Working Documents, Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and 
convergence programme for Hungary and Latvia, SWD(2012) 317 final, SWD(2012) 320 final. . 
84   The recently adopted Youth Employment Package aims to tackle the phenomenon of NEET at 
Member State level. For more information see: COM(2012) 727 final. 
85   In Frazer, H. and Marlier, E. (2012). Assessment of the implementation of the European Commission 
recommendation on active inclusion, Synthesis report.  
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4.2.3.  Income support and work incentives 
For Member States, designing social benefits without eroding incentives to take up 
work  is  a key concern.
86 Schemes are increasingly designed to avoid creating 
unemployment and inactivity traps, as well as low wage traps for people in work and 
in receipt of MI benefits. Member States have, for instance, adopted measures to reduce 
the tax wedge (direct labour taxation plus social security contributions) on lower wages, 
to raise minimum wages, to offer in-work benefits, and they have reviewed the design of 
out-of-work benefits, including social assistance.
87 
Back-to-work benefits and earnings disregards make participation in the labour market 
more viable. Several countries, CY, DE, LT, FR, PT, RO, SI, SE and IE make use of 
various forms of back-to-work or tax allowances, with gradual phasing out of SA 
payments. Similarly, earning disregards are a common practice in CY, DE, AT, BE, LU, 
MT, NL, SK, CZ, DK and LT. In many cases, around 30 % of earnings are disregarded 
when calculating social benefits. In addition, special allowances, e.g. for single parents 
and children (MT) and compensation payments for voluntary work (NL) can top up 
incomes. 
Specific factors in the design of MI schemes might result in disincentives to take up 
work. These include:
88 
1.  high benefit withdrawal rates
89 (also with regard to secondary benefits 
providing access to key services such as health care and childcare); 
2.  lack of systematic mechanisms to adjust the value of earnings disregards
90 
over time so as to avoid their erosion; 
3.  regulations requiring former beneficiaries to refund benefits. 
 
4.3.  Access to quality services 
 
The Recommendation invited Member States to enable access to quality services, 
essential to support people’s inclusion in the labour market and more generally their 
resilience and participation in society, making sure such services are available across 
territories, physically accessible and financially affordable. Such services should 
                                                 
86   The  Employment package (COM(2012) 173 final), launched in April 2012, is a set of policy 
documents looking into how EU employment policies intersect with a number of other policy areas in 
support of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. It identifies the EU’s biggest job potential areas 
and the most effective ways for EU countries to create more jobs. Measures are proposed in the areas 
of supporting job creation, reforming labour markets, investing in skills, improving EU governance, 
etc. 
87    See also European Commission (2009) ‘Recent reforms of the tax and benefit systems in the 
framework of flexicurity’ European Economy Occasional Papers 43, Feb 2009. 
88   EU Network of Independent Experts, 2009. 
89   As a result of taking up work, benefits are reduced significantly. 
90   Earnings disregards are the part of income that is not taken into account when assessing whether 
eligibility conditions are met by the applicants.  
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emphasise solidarity, equal opportunities for users and employees, quality investment in 
human capital and infrastructures, while being designed and delivered in a 
comprehensive and coordinated manner. 
This review shows that the potential to improve access to services seems to be very 
considerable, as few Member States report better access to housing or to childcare, and 
access to social assistance and health services has not improved much either.  
 
Access to services is reviewed according to indicators reflecting access to childcare, 
housing costs, adult participation in education and training, and social gradient
91 in 
unmet need for health care (see Table 3 from the Annex). Differences among Member 
States are most significant on two indicators: access to childcare and participation in 
education and training for those with a low level of education. Group A and B countries, 
mostly in northern and western Europe) tend to have high childcare use and high 
participation in education and training. Group C, D, and E (eastern and southern 
European countries plus Ireland) tend to have low childcare use and low participation in 
education and training. 
A recent OECD study on publicly provided services has confirmed that better access to 
specific services such as healthcare, childcare, housing and care for the elderly can 
contribute significantly to reducing inequality in society and thus reduce the level of 
poverty across various groups.
92 The impact of such services can be particularly relevant 
for 
(1) children and the elderly because of their higher use of education and health services 
respectively; 
(2) single parents, and couples with children, because of their higher use of education 
and childcare services; and 
(3) households with high work intensity. 
Reduced rent tenants and people with a lower level of skills may also benefit, albeit 
less so. Regarding service delivery, there is evidence that universal service provision 
generates fewer problems related to stigmatisation or discrimination compared to 
traditional, targeted social assistance benefits.
93 
 
4.3.1.  Access to services in the Member States
94 
Most Member States report that the poor now have better access to employment and 
training, but the potential of other services to lift people out of poverty remains relatively 
                                                 
91   Social gradient reflects the position of an individual or population group in society and the variations 
in their access to and security of resources such as education, employment and housing, as well as 
different levels of participation in civic society. 
92   OECD-European Commission (2011): The impact of publicly provided services on the distribution of 
resources. 
93   Marx, I. (2010). Minimum income protection in post-industrial economies: on getting the balance right 
between incrementalism and innovation, in Social protection for a post-industrial world, ed. Kemp, P. 
A., International Studies on Social Security, vol. 15. 
94   This section is based on Country Surveys on Active Inclusion unless stated otherwise.  
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underexploited. Several Member States report better access to housing, but few report 
improvements in access to childcare. Better access to social assistance and health 
services ranks below the others. 
Self-reported improvements in access to employment and training opportunities may 
be linked to Member States’ increased use of labour market ‘activation’ approaches, 
tougher conditionality on taking up work, compulsory participation in public works 
programmes and growing sheltered employment.
95 
According to independent EU experts on social inclusion,
96 only a small number of 
Member States have taken steps to improve services essential to support active social and 
economic inclusion policies since 2008. 
Six have focused on those who can work, AT, BE, EE, DE, LU, MT, and four on those 
who cannot, BE, EE, LU, MT. Such services include social assistance services, 
employment and training services, housing support and social housing, childcare, long-
term care services and health services. 
Reported improvements in access refer to such services being set up for these groups in 
the first place, rather than specifically addressing the obstacles disadvantaged groups face 
when trying to access services. There has yet to be more attention to designing services 
to reach out, through e.g. ‘peer’ inclusion, developing effective mixtures of targeted and 
universal services, reducing adverse effects of stigmatisation or removing administrative 
burdens. 
Table 3. Areas in which Member States have improved access to services for the 
most disadvantaged 
a. employment and training  AT; BE; BG; CY; CZ; DK; EE; FI; FR; DE; EL; IE; IT; 
LV; LU; MT; NL; PL; PT; RO; SK; SI; ES; SE; UK 
 
b. social assistance  DK; FI; LT; LU; RO 
c. health  LV; LT; RO; SI;  
d. transportation   BE; AT 
e. housing  AT; BE; BG; DK; FR; LT; LU; RO; SI; ES;  
f. childcare  AT; CY; HU; LU; MT; PL; 
g. banking  CZ; DK; 
 
h. other ______________  EE (in-kind benefits (varies by municipality)); IE 
(education); IT (social card); PT (in kind benefits/ 
associated rights (local level in response to the crisis)); 
UK (school meals for children).  
Source: Country Surveys on Implementation of Active Inclusion Strategies 2008-2011 
                                                 
95   Sheltered employment refers to jobs that provide a certain level of supervision and guidance, usually 
designed for people with disabilities. 
96   Frazer, H. and Marlier, E. 2012. Assessment of the implementation of the European Commission 
recommendation on active inclusion.  
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Among countries reporting better access to housing, BE has set up a national framework 
to reimburse housing-related costs, funded by the autonomous Committee for Regulation 
of Electricity and Gas. Those on social benefits automatically get ‘social’ rates (equalling 
the lowest rate on the market), and there are ceilings on the maximum rates for gas and 
electricity. Beneficiaries can also claim fixed-price heating allowances (stookoliefonds). 
In AT, the new means-tested social assistance scheme (BMS) also assesses housing needs 
and costs. Previously, there was a separate procedure to request a housing allowance. 
Since 2009, RO has a lower eligibility threshold for heating allowances, which benefits 
low-income households. For households on social assistance, heating and gas expenses 
are fully covered by the state. In its NRP, BG allocates funds to expand modern social 
housing for the most vulnerable. Housing allowances are provided on a very 
discretionary basis and access depends on the municipality. In 2009, there was a shift 
from means-tested in-kind heating allowances (e.g. coal blocks) to in-cash heating 
allowances paid directly to electricity providers. 
Six Member States (AT, CY, HU, LU, MT and PL) report better access to childcare 
services for the poor. In 2009, AT introduced compulsory pre-school education (on a 
half-day basis) at federal level. In 2011, the government decided to create an additional 
5000 early childhood education and care institutions between 2012 and 2014. In Vienna, 
childcare for children up to the age of six is free of charge. Since 2009, LU has run a 
‘cheque service’ (child-care service voucher) system, reducing childcare costs, especially 
for low-income families and SA recipients. 
MT, PL and HU report commitments to increasing the number of childcare and toddler 
institutions (‘Maluch’ Programme in PL). Using the ESF, CY planned a 2011 reform of 
its care system, providing partial reimbursements of costs associated with care for 
children, the disabled and older people. However, the reform is intended primarily to 
further women’s participation in the labour market, rather than to improve the situation 
of the poor in general. 
In a number of countries (PT, SK, SI, UK, LT) not reporting better access to childcare 
services, there are nevertheless more in-kind services, such as subsidised transportation, 
school supplies and free school meals for children of SA recipients. 
 
Box 2. Client input into service delivery: Belgium — Expert by Experience 
 
  Involvement of 26 ‘Experts by Experience’ who are experiencing or have 
experienced poverty, spread over 22 administrations, to improve access to 
social services for all citizens (including the poor and those most detached 
from the labour market) 
  Problem: legislation and practices are designed by and for middle class — > 
use of ‘Experts by Experience’ aims to improve accessibility and to make 
known the views of users, so as to improve tailored services 
  Support to experts: training and mentoring system 
  Challenges: dissemination of information about the role of EbyE, define/build 
up profile of EbyE, make sure there is effective communication with 
colleagues about EbyE, improve support systems for coaches and mentors 
Source: SPC Multilateral surveillance on active inclusion, MS presentation,  
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February 27 2012 
 
As for healthcare services, a number of countries provide full cover for SA recipients 
(CY, LU, MT, LV, CZ, UK, SI, ES). BE did not report improvements, but grants SA 
recipients the automatic right to substantial reimbursements of medical costs and a 
guarantee that health expenses do not exceed a certain threshold. In BG, PL and PT, the 
coverage of SA recipients’ health expenses is heavily discretionary and depends on the 
municipality. 
With regard to social assistance services, some governments provide a wide range of 
services at national level. These comprise psycho-social, alcohol and drug counselling 
and family assistance (e.g. DE, SE). In the UK, counselling services are delivered by 
voluntary organisations (Citizens Advice Bureaux). In EE and IT, the availability of such 
services depends on the municipality. Since reforms in 2008, FI has a thorough social 
assistance service, linking assessments of the individual’s capacity to work with job-
seeking assistance and the setting up of employment plans with rehabilitation. The 
delivery of cash and in-kind social assistance is spread across agencies, social workers 
and other professionals. 
Banking and transport services were reported by a few Member States. CZ has 
introduced financial literacy courses at secondary school level and is planning versions 
for primary schools, and may be one of the most innovative service providers. Analysis 
of country surveys shows that banking services (debt, mortgage, counselling and legal 
assistance) are not confined to reporting countries (CZ and DK), but can also be found in 
DE, HU, NL, UK, SI, EE, IT, LV. The same applies to free public transport. AT grants 
free access to public transport to SA recipients, as do CY and LU, as well as FR, at least 
partially. Subsidised public transport is available to SA recipients in BG and PT. 
The EU social inclusion experts
97 provide examples of measures that improve the 
inclusiveness of education and training opportunities. BE is reforming tertiary and 
secondary education systems to widen access and is improving transitions from education 
to work through better career guidance and partnerships with enterprises. DK is 
developing effective lifelong learning strategies and increasing the number of young 
unemployed people being trained through apprenticeship schemes. It is developing jobs 
and skills development packages for young people who are academically weak. In the 
Estonian NRP, a lot of attention is paid to preventing and reducing youth unemployment 
by providing high-quality education, reducing school drop-out rates and preparing young 
people more effectively for working life. 
In a number of Member States, food aid is available in various forms. In EE and IT, 
‘social cards’ make people on low incomes eligible for food aid. In PL and PT, food aid 
was introduced as an immediate response to the social consequences of the crisis. RO has 
increased the number of social canteens in urban areas. They provide two hot meals a day 
for SA recipients and families on low incomes. In SI, NGOs provide free packages of 
food, vaccination and clothing. In the UK, those on income support or jobseeker 
allowance can apply for ‘healthy start vouchers’ to be spent on milk, fresh fruit and 
vegetables or infant formula. 
                                                 
97   Frazer, H. and Marlier, E. 2012. Assessment of the implementation of the European Commission 
recommendation on active inclusion.  
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Especially non-EU migrants face difficulties when accessing certain enabling services. In 
particular, migrants face obstacles when it comes to access to education (especially 
higher education), employment services (including information on job vacancies), 
financial services, and family and child benefits. These obstacles are often due to 
problems related to the transferability of the rights to access social assistance, 
unemployment benefits or other related services, the appropriate recognition of 
qualifications and the long contribution periods required to use some of these benefits 
(unemployment benefits, social assistance).
98 
 
4.3.1.1.Focus on childcare 
The availability and affordability of childcare has a crucial influence on parents’ access 
to the labour market. This holds true particularly for second earners and single parents on 
low incomes. The availability, quality and affordability of childcare remain an issue in 
many countries, as highlighted in nine of the country-specific recommendations the 
European Council adopted in July 2010 (CZ, DE, IT, SK, UK, MT, PL, AT, and HU). 
The challenge is even greater for households on a low income. 
Persisting low access to childcare for households on low income 
The latest information from EU-SILC shows that most Member States are lagging behind 
EU targets for childcare set in 2002, the so-called Barcelona targets. In 2010, there was 
provision for 28 % of children below the age of three and 83 % of children between the 
ages of three and six. Access appears to be most difficult for households with low 
incomes. Those on low incomes make far less use of childcare. This is also the case in 
countries close to achieving the target, with a few exceptions, such as Denmark or 
Sweden.
99 This gradient shows the additional obstacles that households on low incomes 
face when they seek childcare, which include: 
•  employment status — the more hours one or both parents work, the greater their 
need for childcare; 
•  eligibility criteria — e.g. places may be reserved for parents that are employed; 
•  lack of services, particularly in disadvantaged or rural areas; 
•  lack of affordable services. 
Affordability remains a major challenge 
                                                 
98   Institute for the Study of Labour and the Economic and Social Research Institute (2011). Study on 
active inclusion of migrants,  
99   The unequal benefits of activation: an analysis of the social distribution of family policy among 
families with young children, Joris Ghysels and Wim Van Lancker, 2011 Journal of European Social 
Policy.  
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Chart 9: Public expenditure on early child care and education by income quintile 
 
Source: M. Vaalavuo 
Despite the redistributive effects of government support, the cost of childcare is still an 
obstacle for families on low incomes, as it can significantly reduce disposable income. 
Even after deducting government support, out-of-pocket expenses for two preschool 
children can add up to 20 % or more of a family budget.
100 Single parents are least able to 
afford childcare. 
The cost of childcare can be an obstacle to parents wanting to go back to work, especially 
for single parents and second earners on a low income. These costs appear to create 
significant inactivity traps in a number of EU countries, by reducing net income gains 
from employment to such an extent that parents are better off caring for their children 
themselves
101 at home. The pattern of such disincentives varies in different countries: 
high childcare costs (IE and MT), low earning prospects (in CZ, SI) or a combination of 
both (BG, LV). 
These barriers could be addressed if government assistance to reduce the cost of 
childcare targeted low-income families more effectively. 
5.  COMPREHENSIVE POLICY DESIGN, INTEGRATED IMPLEMENTATION, VERTICAL 
COORDINATION, AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF RELEVANT ACTORS 
5.1.  Integrated Approaches 
The 2008 Recommendation advocated an integrated approach to active inclusion which 
should have yielded a one-stop-shop approach, delivering on all pillars in an integrated 
manner that could reduce the administrative burden on both customer and provider. An 
integrated, comprehensive approach should be based on: 
•  comprehensive policy design, 
•  integrated implementation, 
•  vertical coordination, 
•  participation of relevant stakeholders. 
                                                 
100   ‘Can parents afford to work? Childcare costs, tax-benefit policies and work incentives’, OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers, No 31, 2006, available at:   
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/23/35862266.pdf. 
101   ‘Report on childcare costs — Can parents afford to work? An update’ OECD, 2011.  
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Assessment of the effectiveness of active inclusion strategies requires further analysis 
based on adequate, up-to-date data. Limited evidence available
102 shows that Member 
States have not yet developed fully-fledged integrated, comprehensive strategies, though 
several have taken encouraging steps. This may be due to the greater fiscal and 
administrative burden of implementing such a strategy. 
A fully comprehensive policy has to define the right mix of the three strands of active 
inclusion, taking into account their joint impact on the social and economic integration of 
disadvantaged people and their possible interrelationships, including synergies and trade-
offs. 
According to the independent experts’ analyses,
103 such a strategy is only evident in 
about a quarter of Member States (DK, FI, FR, MT, NL, PL, SE) for those who can work 
and in just two Member States (NL, SI) for those who cannot. Only six Member States 
(BE, DK, FR, MT, SI, SE) have developed effective systems for integrated 
implementation of active inclusion policies for those who can work and only three (LU, 
MT, SI) for those who cannot. 
The extent to which there is effective policy coordination among local, regional, 
national (and EU) authorities in the light of their particular roles, competences and 
priorities varies significantly across countries. Five (BE, DK, FI, LU, NL) are assessed as 
having such coordination arrangements for active inclusion measures both for those who 
can work and for those who cannot. The results of the full analysis are summarised in 
Table 5 in the Annex. 
The assessment of the country surveys on active inclusion shows that most Member 
States report a fully-integrated strategy. Only six countries report a partially-integrated 
strategy, and IT and EL report a non-integrated approach. A closer analysis of the active 
inclusion policies reported
104 reveals what Member States understand by an integrated 
strategy. 
Table 4. Integrated active inclusion strategy among the Member States 
a.) fully integrated: 
minimum income scheme 
is linked to labour 
activation measures and 
access to services 
AT; BE; CY; DK; FI; DE; HU; LV; LU; MT; NL; PL; PT; 
SK, SI; SE; UK; CZ; RO 
  
b.) partially integrated: 
minimum income scheme 
linked with labour 
activation measures 
BG; FR; IE; LT; ES; EE 
e.) not integrated   EL; IT 
                                                 
102   Based on the informal consultation (carried out in April-May 2012) of civil society organisations and 
the Country reports on active inclusion. 
103  Frazer, H. and Marlier, E. 2012. Assessment of the implementation of the European Commission 
recommendation on active inclusion. 
104   Based on cross-analysis of Questions 15 and 16 (Describe the specific programme(s) that integrate (s) 
any of the three pillars by providing the starting date of the programme). It should be noticed that most 
Member States did not report any specific programmes under Q16.  
45 
Source: Country Surveys on Implementation of Active Inclusion Strategies 
between 2008-2011 
For countries classifying themselves as providers of fully-integrated strategies, e.g. AT, 
BE, UK, an integrated strategy means minimum income recipients have an ‘automatic 
right’ (enshrined in law) to services and to participation in ALMPs. 
However, as in the case of the UK, policies are often designed to strengthen the link 
between MI and ALMPs rather than linking MI-ALMPs-Services, and services are often 
focused mostly on childcare. 
Countries report significant obstacles to a full-fledged strategy. These involve problems 
with implementation at local level, e.g. due to coordination problems between public 
employment services (PES) and social agencies; policy competences scattered across 
policy levels; restricted access to services due to lack of funding (e.g. in PT) and lack of 
political prioritisation. 
Countries classifying themselves as providers of partially-integrated strategies report the 
following obstacles. In FR, RSA recipients registered with the public employment 
services do not automatically receive support in training and education; access to services 
depends heavily on the financial situation in a region. In BG, few employment services 
are specifically targeted to minimum income recipients. In LT, not all recipients of 
minimum income benefit from their right to a housing allowance. The situation varies 
substantially by municipality. 
Civil society organisations report a different picture. There is consensus that fully-
fledged integrated and comprehensive strategies have not yet been developed by Member 
States, and that there has been too much emphasis on the employment pillar. Civil 
society organisations refer to various reasons for the lack of fully-fledged integrated and 
comprehensive strategies: lack of political will, coordination problems, competences 
fragmented across policy levels, the economic crisis and austerity measures. 
This is partly echoed by researchers
105 on poverty and social exclusion, who note that 
the European agenda on combating poverty and social exclusion appears to be moving 
towards a largely employment-focused analysis of poverty. They make a claim for 
greater clarity on concepts and objectives within a coherent, multidimensional model of 
social and economic disadvantage. 
5.2.  Participation of relevant actors 
 
No involvement or very limited involvement of all relevant actors
106 in the 
development, implementation and evaluation of active inclusion strategies is reported by 
larger social networks (EAPN, Eurodiaconia, and Cities for Active Inclusion -
EUROCITIES). 
                                                 
105   Working Paper ‘Political Implications of the Current Debate on Poverty, Deprivation and Social 
Exclusion in Europe’ by Bjørn Hvinden & Rune Halvorsen (NOVA), October 2012. This theoretical 
paper is the first deliverable of the FP7 Research project COPE: ‘Combating Poverty in Europe: Re-
organising Active Inclusion through Participatory and Integrated Modes of Multilevel Governance’ 
(COPE) — http://cope-research.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Paper_Political_implications.pdf . 
106   Including those affected by poverty and social exclusion, civil society organisations, non-
governmental organisations and service providers.  
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Whilst EAPN members can highlight no current examples of participation of 
stakeholders in the design and delivery of an explicit AI strategy, they highlight active 
participation in the National Action Plans/Social Reports under the Social OMC (2000-
2010) and/or NRPs, often promoting strong proposals on Active Inclusion.. In the first 
NRPs of Europe 2020, whilst 13 National Networks were invited to participate in the 
NRP process (AT, BE, BG, DK, EE, FR, DE, IE, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE), the level of 
meaningful stakeholder participation was scored very low (2.38 of 10), with most scoring 
very low (AT, BG, CZ, DK, EE, IE, IT, MT, NL, PL, RO, SK, SE, UK), with only 
Belgium and Spain giving a positive rating (7 and 8). However, even in these countries, it 
was difficult to get proposals taken on board, and in the case of Spain, to get 
implementation. 
Eurodiaconia confirms that its members in DE, SE, DK were not involved in the 
development, implementation and evaluation of the strategies, with the exception of CZ 
which had been consulted via EAPN. 
CfAI-EUROCITIES reports that involvement of relevant actors differs between cities. At 
local level, cities rely largely on involving relevant stakeholders such as NGOs. 
However, the extent to which cities are consulted at national level is not always 
satisfactory. As AGE Platform Europe reports, in several (BE, FR, ML, SI) of its 
member countries, AGE organizations are involved in regular consultation processes on 
social policy and can comment on draft reports upon request. 
 
5.3.  Case studies –Recent developments at national level 
 
RSA (revenue de solidarite active) in France
107 
The Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA) can be seen as a cornerstone of France’s current 
antipoverty policy, in combination with the minimum wage and employment subsidies. The 
declared objectives are to integrate and simplify existing benefit schemes, to combat poverty 
more efficiently and to foster the transition into work. 
The RSA itself integrates several pre-existing schemes: 
•  Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI ― the mainstream guaranteed minimum income); 
•  Allocation de Parent Isolé (API ― single parent benefit); and to some extent; 
•  Prime Pour l’Emploi (PPE ― a large-scale tax credit scheme designed to encourage part-
time or low-paid employment and affecting 9 million households). 
The RSA encourages the take-up of work by exempting 62 % of any earnings in calculating 
benefit. Experiments have been conducted in 34 ‘départements’; the scheme has been 
mainstreamed as from June 2009. 
The following parameters sketch an overall picture of the scheme: 
•  The RSA scheme is equivalent to a negative income tax. A basic benefit of € 410 (for a 
single adult) or € 590 (for a couple with no children) applies to claimants who do not work; for 
those who work, earnings are topped up by an in-work RSA supplement in such a way that 62 % 
of their net earnings are exempted. The implicit tax rate is set so as to make the benefit expire as 
the claimant’s earnings approach the poverty threshold (SMIC = approx. € 1 200 gross/ € 950 
                                                 
107   Ides Nicaise (2011): Building the tools to fight in-work poverty, Synthesis report, France. Available at: 
www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu. .  
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net). In comparison with the pre-existing schemes, the RSA focuses more on the lowest income 
group and, above all, strengthens the work incentive component. 
•  0.8 million households are expected to receive just the basic RSA (at zero earnings level) 
each trimester, while 1.8 million others would receive the RSA in-work supplement. Among the 
latter, 400 000 households would earn less than the basic benefit and would therefore receive both 
the basic and the in-work RSA. Overall, 6.9 million persons will be covered. 
•  As the basic RSA will just replace existing schemes, the additional cost of the RSA will 
be attributable entirely to the (extra) in-work benefit payments, which will amount to € 1.5 billion 
per year. Savings on unemployment benefits because of increased employment have not been 
estimated. 
One of the explicit aims of the law is also to strengthen the activation pillar of social assistance. 
The issue of the access to RSA for citizens of other EU Member States demonstrating a real link 
with the French labour market is under assessment. Evaluations of the RMI system had revealed 
that only a minority of beneficiaries held a reintegration contract. An objective of the RSA 
reform is to assign a personal adviser to each household, to adopt a ‘rights and duties’ strategy 
from day one, and to transfer individuals more effectively into work or other activities.  
 
UK: administrative simplification and stronger work incentives through the universal credit
108 
To tackle administrative complexity whilst increasing incentives to work, the UK will 
progressively introduce from 2013 to 2017 a single Universal Credit. Most means-tested benefits 
and tax credits for working adults (including Income Support, income-related Jobseeker’s 
Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance) will be replaced by a single benefit. 
Claimants will receive just one monthly payment, paid into a bank account in the same way as a 
monthly salary. Support with housing costs will also go directly to the claimant as part of their 
monthly payment. 
The principal aim of Universal Credit is to simplify the system, making it easier for people to 
understand, and easier and cheaper for staff to administer. Claimants in need of various forms of 
support will spend less time claiming multiple benefits and can receive one single streamlined 
payment. People can apply through their local authorities or online, and can manage their claim 
through an online account. By eliminating multiple benefit applications and improving access, 
this system is expected to improve take-up of benefits by those who are entitled to them. 
As the Universal Credit integrates both in- and out-of-work benefits, it seeks to smooth the 
transitions into and out of work and reduce disincentives to entering the labour market. The 
reform also aims to increase work incentives through a lower withdrawal rate (65 %) and stricter 
rules on benefit loss if an individual refuses a job offer. From May 2012, lone parents will be 
required to actively seek work when their youngest child begins full-time education. A cap on the 
total amount of benefit that can be claimed could boost incentives to work and generate savings, 
however declining benefit levels could also translate into increased risk of poverty for claimants. 
High housing costs will also still mean that households in many areas will continue to face high 
marginal withdrawal rates up to a relatively high point in the income distribution. 
Universal Credit has the potential of improving the accessibility of benefits to those entitled to 
them, though the success of this strategy will depend on its successful administration and proper 
response to the above challenges. Progress will be monitored on the national and EU level in the 
framework of the European Semester. 
 
                                                 
108   SWD(2012) 309 final, Commission Staff Working Document, Assessment of the 2012 national reform 
programme and convergence programme for the United Kingdom.  
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Iceland: Monitoring the Welfare System
109 
Early in 2009, the government set up a new body to monitor welfare developments during the 
crisis, aiming to provide early warning of issues of concern as well as providing guidelines to 
administrators, government and social organisations in the third sector. 
The body is called Welfare Watch (WW — see website: 
http://www.velferdarraduneyti.is/velferdarvaktin). It is based at the Ministry of Social Affairs 
(later the Ministry of Welfare) and composed of representatives from government (ministries and 
institutes), municipalities, social organisations and unions. Various subgroups were also formed 
with the aim of focusing on special areas of concern. It was thus primarily a consultative body 
with powers to issue guidelines and have influence on detailed policy decisions. 
The WW has been quite active. It has commissioned reports and assessments of various policy 
areas, sent out recommendations to targeted actors and reported regularly to government. The 
WW has focused mainly on the following: 
•  Welfare of children 
•  Problems of young individuals, aged 16-25 
•  Employment issues and job search 
•  Rationalisation measures of municipalities (esp. related to provision of welfare to the most 
needy — concerning the last stop in the welfare system) 
•  Social services of local communities 
•  Issues of disabled pensioners (a group traditionally subject to financial hardship and social 
exclusion) 
•  Position of the elderly 
•  Issues concerning immigrants 
Welfare Watch has been an important and interesting innovation to emerge during the crisis, 
directly addressing crisis-related issues. Iceland has a tradition of allowing grassroots voices to be 
heard and one of WW’s valuable roles has been to channel these voices into bigger awareness-
raising movements, with pressure to get issues of local importance aired more generally.  
 
BMS (Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung) in Austria 
The BMS, a nationwide means-tested minimum income scheme, replaced former Austrian social 
assistance programmes on 1 September 2010. Its aim is to prevent social exclusion and poverty, 
strengthen support for those returning to work and to harmonise to a certain degree the various 
social assistance programmes of the Länder. Today, the nine Länder define minimum income 
schemes according to the BMS, which may, however, be supplemented by additional regionally 
defined benefits. The Länder are responsible for the administration and financing of the scheme. 
In 2012, the gross social assistance rate (including a basic housing subsidy of 25 %) for a couple 
in Vienna was €1 159.88, a slight increase from 2011 when it was €1 129.42. The BMS functions 
as a social protection scheme of last resort, based on ‘help for self-help’. It focuses on getting 
people back into employment by granting a minimum income, social services and job training. 
The city of Vienna’s Step2Job project is a good example of an integrated activation approach. 
Designed as a case management project, BMS recipients receive personalised qualification 
measures or in-job training alongside psychological, social and indebtedness advisory services. 
Internships are also available, set up especially for BMS recipients, during which job coaching is 
                                                 
109   Stefan Ollafson (2012). Iceland’s way out of the crisis, Social protection, redistribution, stimulus, and austerity, A 
study of national policies. Available at: www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu.  
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available. There are German language courses for BMS recipients with a migrant background. 
Conditionality is tight. To be eligible for the minimum income, Austrian citizenship or equal 
status on grounds of EU law is required, or refugee status under the Geneva Convention. There is 
strict means-testing and recipients are regularly checked for their willingness and ability to work. 
Employment and social agencies have started sharing data on recipients to make checking faster 
and more efficient. Recipients are obliged to accept job offers; otherwise, their benefits may be 
partially or — in exceptional cases — fully withdrawn. Sanctions should prevent long-term 
dependence on social welfare, which reduces earnings over a lifetime and affects pensions. 
 
5.4.  Budgetary effects of active inclusion strategies 
 
There is no specific financial data on active inclusion strategies implemented at Member 
State level. Spending on social assistance rose in the first years of the crisis as part of a 
stimulus of the overall economy (including the increase in the number of social 
assistance recipients). From 2010, with the deepening of the sovereign debt crises and in 
the framework of the exit strategies from the temporary measures taken since 2008, 
Member States reduced spending and pursued a more stringent fiscal policy. 
Spending on social protection varies across Member States (see Chart 10). It is lowest 
relative to GDP in Member States such as LV, RO and BG (around 17 % in 2010), and 
highest in DK, FR and NL (above 32 % in 2010). At EU level, social protection 
expenditure reached slightly less than 30 % of GDP. All EU-15 countries except for LU 
spent at least 25 % of their GDP on social protection in 2010 (ES slightly more than 25 % 
of GDP, followed by PT, UK and EL). All EU-12 countries spent less than this. The 
highest spending was recorded in DK, FR, DE and NL. 
 
Chart 10: Social protection expenditure as share of GDP in EU Member States 
(2010, percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: ESSPROS 
 
A further examination (see Chart 11) of expenditure by function shows that most 
spending on social protection is not necessarily linked to active inclusion and goes 
namely on invalidity allowances, old age and survivors’ pensions, and certain parts of 
sickness/healthcare benefits). 
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Chart 11: Social protection expenditure by function (2010, percentage of GDP) 
Source: ESSPROS 
Evidence on the effectiveness of active inclusion strategies requires further analysis 
based on adequate, up-to-date data. A recent evaluation of the French RSA shows a 
minor improvement in terms of poverty reduction: 78, 000 households have risen above 
the threshold of low income (due to the ‘active’ RSA), that is, 145 000 persons or 0.2 % 
of those on low incomes.
110 This seemingly modest impact was achieved against the 
backdrop of the economic crisis. An examination of the impact of the Hartz reforms in 
Germany on benefit dependency suggests there has been no significant change in 
‘structural’ dependence on state support, i.e. that the prospects of recipients did not 
improve with the reforms.
111  
The results of a recent EUROFOUND report on the active inclusion of young people 
with disabilities and health problems
112 underline that much needs to be improved to 
achieve an effective and tailored implementation of active inclusion strategies. It reports 
an increase in the take-up of disability benefits, debt as a risk factor, the negative impact 
of increasing work intensity for this specific group, as well as the absence of pathways 
from education to the labour market and social inclusion. 
 
6.  COORDINATING  EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICIES: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION IN PROMOTING THE ACTIVE INCLUSION STRATEGY 
The European Commission has been working closely with Member States, in the context 
of the Social Protection Committee and its Indicators Subgroup, on identifying the most 
appropriate indicators for assessing the country-specific challenges and progress related 
                                                 
110   Based on the SPC multilateral thematic surveillance on active inclusion (27 February 2012). 
111   Konigs, S. (2012): The dynamics of social assistance receipt in Germany, OECD country study for the 
European Commission. 
112   See at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/socialcohesion/illnessdisabilityyoung.htm. .  
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to the implementation of the active inclusion strategy and its evaluation in the context of 
the European Semester. As outlined in the analysis above, for some aspects there is a lack 
of up to date, harmonised and cross-country comparable data. Work is ongoing both in 
terms of further improving the set of indicators used to monitor the strategy and on data 
collection to make more data available. 
According to the Commission’s proposal on instruments
113 for cohesion policy for the 
next programming period (2014-2020), the European Social Fund would step up its 
support for social inclusion policies, including active inclusion. In line with the Europe 
2020 strategy of reducing poverty by 20 million people by 2020, it proposes that: 
•  at least 25 per cent of the cohesion policy envelope be dedicated to ESF 
investments 
•  at least 20 per cent of all national ESF allocations be earmarked to support social 
inclusion policies. 
Accordingly, in the 2014-2020 financing period, active inclusion will be one of the 
investment priorities of the ESF with the objective of promoting social inclusion and 
combating poverty. In order to ensure that the co-financed programmes succeed in 
promoting active inclusion, funding will be conditional on putting in place national 
strategies for poverty reduction. Such strategies should aim at the active inclusion of 
people excluded from the labour market. More specifically, it is required that the national 
active inclusion strategy is in accordance with the poverty and social exclusion target of 
the country concerned, involves the relevant stakeholders and provides a sufficient 
evidence base to monitor developments. 
If the fund’s interventions are to be successful, they will need to be underpinned by an 
integrated response, addressing the different needs of the specific target groups facing 
labour market exclusion. In this respect, it will be necessary to put in place (i) a 
combination of tailor-made support measures to improve the employability of the 
individual, (ii) initiatives to help the individual to access different services necessary for 
re-integration and (iii) better functioning social and unemployment benefit systems and 
minimum income and pension schemes that provide adequate and incentivising support 
in a cost-effective manner. The actions of the European Social Fund can be 
complemented by the European Regional Development Fund with investment in 
childcare infrastructure, education infrastructure, healthcare infrastructure, long term care 
services and housing to provide better access to services for the most disadvantaged.
114 
 
                                                 
113   COM(2011) 615 final: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, 
the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion 
Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006; and COM(2011) 607: Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Social Fund and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006. 
114   See European Commission Staff Working Document - Social Investment through the European Social 
Fund, SWD(2013)44.  
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6.1.  On-going monitoring and evaluation through the Europe 2020 Strategy 
Member States continue to state their commitment to fighting social exclusion and 
poverty in their 2012 National Reform Programmes (NRPs). All of them mention policy 
measures from the active inclusion strategy. However, these are not always identified as 
such. Compared to 2011,
115 the NRPs, in general, do not reflect the integrated nature of 
the strategies. 
FI, UK, FR, CY, DK, EE, DE, IT, LT, NL, PL, RO, SK, ES, SE, LV and CZ do not 
explicitly mention the concept of active inclusion in their 2012 NRPs. HU, LU, PT, AT, 
BE, BG, EL, IE and MT explicitly mention it. However none of the latter set gives a 
definition of its active inclusion strategy or elaborates on its content. 
The nine countries explicitly mentioning the concept of active inclusion can be located 
on a continuum indicating different degrees of engagement with the strategy. 
Some countries mention active inclusion, but there is no evidence of actual policy behind 
it. BG, for example, only lists ‘active inclusion’ in the Annex of its NRP in relation to a 
Country Specific Recommendation on labour market reform. 
HU describes active inclusion as a policy separate from policies to improve access to 
services, suggesting incomplete understanding of the strategy, which has not been fully 
applied. Active inclusion initiatives in EL narrowly focus on providing basic services and 
creating ‘safety nets’. 
At the other end of the continuum are countries that give specific examples of how the 
concept translates into concrete policy. Examples are the Flemish w² work-welfare 
programme to foster job seekers from vulnerable groups by strengthening coordination 
between policy domains (social economy, work and welfare), and public employment 
services (PES) plus social assistance services. AT defines active inclusion as a guiding 
principle for inclusion policies (there is evidence that the recent reform of the social 
protection system
116 has many elements of the active inclusion strategy). 
LU, on the other hand, focuses on labour market activation approaches. IE is keeping up 
efforts to develop the one-shop model (‘National Employment and Entitlements Service’) 
to cut the administrative costs of services for both client and provider. 
FR and the UK are among those that do not refer to the concept of active inclusion in 
their NRPs, despite having reformed their social protection systems and modernised 
employment policies in accordance with some of the elements in the 2008 
Recommendation. 
In terms of the National Social Reports (NSRs) twelve Member States (out of the total of 
twenty one that submitted a report by late 2012)
117 do not mention the concept of active 
inclusion (AT, DK, EL, FR, HU, LV, NL, PL, RO, SI, SK, UK). Nine Member States 
mention the concept of active inclusion explicitly in their NSRs (BE, BG, CY, CZ, ES, 
FI, LU, MT, PT). Countries mentioning active inclusion in their NRPs do not necessarily 
overlap with countries mentioning it in NSRs (namely CY, FI, CZ). 
                                                 
115   EU Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion. (2011). Assessment of progress towards the 
Europe 2020 social inclusion objectives, Synthesis Report. Available at: www.peer-review-social-
inclusion.eu. 
116   See section 5.3 of this paper. 
117   See: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=758&langId=en.   
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Member States mentioning the concept of active inclusion differ in the kinds of active 
inclusion initiatives they prioritise. The Belgium NSR presents a number of active 
inclusion-related measures focusing on changes in the tax and child benefit system to 
counter in-work poverty. For 2013, it is planned to raise the tax-exempted income of 
low- and middle income persons by € 200. Additionally, the Brussels Capital Region has 
set up a plan to improve the integration of migrants (‘Anti-Discrimination and Diversity 
Plan’) and a Roma Strategy. Belgium is tackling the adequacy of social benefits through 
a linking of the social benefits to the development of the general standards of living 
(‘well-being envelope’). Since 2008, single parent households have been granted higher 
child allowance and since 2010 they also have practically free healthcare.  
LU’s comprehensive policy includes higher investment in the quality of the pre-school 
system, in children and parent pre-school learning. Moreover, it focuses on targeted 
policies to reduce the number of young NEETs by expanding the capacity of the 
‘Voluntary Guidance Program’ which is to be evaluated through a qualitative study this 
year. Additionally, information centres for minimum income recipients are planned and 
since 2011, more funding has been allocated to social aid and a strategy against 
homelessness and social exclusion has been developed.  
The Spanish NSR refers explicitly to the active inclusion recommendation and states that 
active inclusion is the intellectual framework within which Spain’s NRP objectives are 
defined since the 2011 NRP. The social inclusion measures are structured around the 
three pillars of active inclusion with a long list of initiatives, including the combination 
of income support with ALMPs. 
FI describes active inclusion as a ‘major challenge and future priority’ pointing to the 
importance of enhancing employment and income security, well-being and health issues. 
However, few concrete active inclusion initiatives can be identified in its NSR.  
PT, LU and CZ explicitly refer to the importance of an integrated active inclusion 
strategy. However, in the PT and particularly in the CZ case, where reforms of the social 
benefit system have not been aligned with ALMPs targeting the unemployed, there is 
little evidence that policies are actually interlinked. 
Various active inclusion-related measures can be found in the NSRs of those Member 
States that do not explicitly refer to the concept of active inclusion. NL presents a wide 
range of original measures across the three pillars. Efforts to promote labour market 
participation among the most disadvantaged have concentrated on improving 
coordination between employers, municipalities and sheltered employment organisations, 
using social return investments and providing support to lone-parents by exempting them 
from the obligation to work until the child reaches the age of five. Since January 2012, 
the government has been able to check on whether municipalities comply with the new 
regulations entailed in the Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB). Since February 
2012, municipalities have had a legal obligation to provide debt counselling. 
Additionally, the 2008 ‘Municipal Compass’ programme addressing homelessness has 
been expanded to more municipalities. Finally, investments have been increased to 
enhance the quality of pre-school education through smaller pre-school groups and 
better-qualified personnel. 
The concept of active inclusion is not mentioned in the Austrian NSR, however, the 
‘Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung(BMS)’ seems quite close to the idea of active 
inclusion. Since its start, more than 29000 BMS recipients have found a job. A study 
about the employment careers of BMS recipients reveals also that after 9 months one out 
of four persons were considered as integrated into the labour market and noted a decrease 
from 89 % to 70 % of those recipients which have no income sources other than the BMS.  
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The French NSR announces efforts to fight in-work poverty, promote the social economy 
and the ‘Work in Station’ programme targeting the homeless, a follow up initiative to the 
2009 ‘Hope in Station’ programme.  
The UK presents its new ‘Work Programme’ offering a more personalised job coaching 
system bound to tighter conditionality. Furthermore, the ‘Youth Contract’ will offer a 
voluntary work experience place for every unemployed 18-24 year old who wants one to 
give them real, valuable experience of work. It will also offer 160,000 Wage Incentives 
for employers who recruit an 18-24 year old from the Work Programme and at least 
20,000 extra incentive payments for small employers to take on apprentices aged 16-24.  
BG presents policy reforms targeting the employability of the unemployed through 
expanded training and education programs. It further refers to the 2012 approval by the 
Council of Ministers of a National Concept for the Social Economy. HU’s objectives 
focus on activating the labour market and boosting the employability of the long-term 
unemployed through subsidies for employers and public employment programmes.  
Active inclusion was a priority in the monitoring of key policies during the European 
Semester within the Europe 2020 Strategy. In June 2012, the European Council adopted 
Country Specific Recommendations directly relevant to the Recommendation on active 
inclusion for AT, CZ, DE, HU, IT, SK, UK, MT, PL. 
Some CSRs called for income support to be made more efficient to protect against 
poverty (LV, BG). 
Many addressed the issue of the inclusive labour market, by: 
•  combating labour market segmentation and in-work poverty (PL), 
•  tackling work disincentives for workers on low income, including women and the 
elderly (AT, BE, DE, NL), 
•  strengthening the activation capacity of public employment services, stepping up 
efforts related to long term unemployed, jobless households or disadvantaged 
groups (DE, HU, UK), 
•  boosting the activating capacity of public work schemes (HU), 
•  better targeting subsidised employment (DK), 
•  improving the labour market position of the long term unemployed (FI) and those 
with a migrant background (DK). 
The focus of CSRs related to services has been on quality, availability and affordability 
of childcare (AT, CZ, DE, HU, IT, PL, MT, SK, UK). The UK’s CSR specifically 
mentioned affordable housing. 
Other CSRs mention integrated approaches, calling for links between social assistance 
reform and activation measures to be strengthened (LT). 
 
6.2.  Other relevant initiatives 
The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion has called for social 
objectives to be mainstreamed into sectoral policies. The Commission has adopted a 
Recommendation on rights to basic bank account.
118. Furthermore, the Commission is 
                                                 
118   See: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2011/c_2011_4977_en.pdf.  
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working on a legislative package on bank accounts. This initiative, which is part of the 
Commission’s 2013 Work programme and has also been announced in the Single Market 
Act II (key action 12), aims to (1) facilitate access for every consumer to payment 
accounts with basic features in the Union for free or at a reasonable charge, (2) enhance 
transparency and comparability of bank fees by developing common tools allowing 
consumers to compare and choose the best product for their needs, and (3) facilitate bank 
account switching both at national level and at cross-border level.  
The new directive on energy efficiency
119 also takes into account the specific needs of 
disadvantaged groups by giving new rights to consumers as regards access to information 
from metering and billing of individual energy consumption and by encouraging Member 
States to include socially-oriented requirements in their national schemes, to ensure that 
vulnerable customers can reap the benefits of higher energy efficiency. 
The Commission has also proposed the creation of a Fund for European Aid to the most 
Deprived,
120 with a total budget of € 2.5 billion (October 2012). The Fund would support 
Member State schemes providing food to the most deprived and clothing and other 
essential goods to homeless people and materially-deprived children. 
Social entrepreneurship, and more broadly the social economy, is an important element 
of the highly competitive social market economy.
121 Social businesses are 
demonstrating resilience to the crisis and the capacity to generate sustainable 
employment for disadvantaged people. Their promotion was one of the levers of the first 
Single Market Act (SMA)
122 and remains a priority in SMA II.
123 The Commission’s 
‘Social Business Initiative’
124 which followed the SMA, set out a comprehensive strategy 
to develop a favourable environment for social entrepreneurship including measures to 
improve access to finance, visibility and awareness-raising, as well as a more appropriate 
regulatory framework. Given that a proactive involvement of workers in their 
companies has a strong impact on their societal responsibility and productivity, the 
Commission will also focus its attention on the issue of cooperatives and employee 
share-ownership. 
Several Member States contribute significantly to supporting the further development of 
social enterprises and the social economy in general through specific legislation (ES, 
FIN, PT), national strategies (BG, UK, RO) or statistics (FR, ES, PT). 
 
                                                 
119   Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency, amending 
Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC. 
120   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Fund for European 
Aid to the Most Deprived, COM(2012) 617 final. 
121   See the section on social economy in European Commission Staff Working Document - Social 
Investment through the European Social Fund, SWD(2013) 44.. 
122   COM(2011) 206 final ‘Single Market Act’ See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/index_en.htm. 
123   COM(2012) 573 final ‘Single Market Act II’. 
124  COM(2011) 682 final ‘Creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the 
social economy and innovation’.  
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7.  FOLLOW-UP 
7.1.1.  Follow-up at national level 
•  Safeguard the integrated approach, building on all three pillars of the active 
inclusion strategy, without unduly prioritising any of them. In a context of strict 
austerity, Member States might be tempted to focus on measures such as 
activation (less costly) over providing an adequate livelihood (more costly). 
However, the fight against poverty and providing long-term, sustainable, stable 
employment opportunities and growth can only be effective if all three pillars are 
taken into consideration. An integrated active inclusion strategy can also prevent 
people from losing their accumulated human capital. 
•  Mainstream the active inclusion strategy in the monitoring and evaluation of 
National Reform Programmes in the area of social inclusion. Active inclusion 
contains the mix of policy interventions needed to fight poverty successfully. To 
improve monitoring and evaluation, Member States could report on the way they 
have implemented the strategies in their NSRs. 
•  Roll out local active inclusion pilot projects at national level. There is 
evidence of successful active inclusion strategies at local level. Moreover, social 
experimentation
125 can help test policies at local level, and if successful, these 
can be rolled out nationally. Bottom-up implementation would be of benefit and 
guarantee effectiveness. 
•  Focus on household characteristics as potential drivers of effective social 
policy. The period since the adoption of the recommendation on active inclusion 
has been instrumental in identifying the major challenges facing active inclusion. 
Now it is time to move towards understanding the deeper causes of the problems. 
A better understanding of the institutional environment that shapes labour 
market and social policies for disadvantaged groups can help in designing 
appropriate policies. Tailored support for the disadvantaged through more 
childcare for families, especially single parents, better access to services, with due 
consideration for the specific needs of the low skilled, long-term unemployed, 
disabled, migrants, the homeless, the elderly, and the Roma community, can 
help active inclusion strategies to succeed. 
•  Engage relevant actors more vigorously in the development, implementation, 
and assessment of policies. Active inclusion is a joint responsibility in European 
societies. Efforts to engage the relevant actors need a boost. The actors include 
those affected by poverty and social exclusion, civil society organisations, non-
governmental organisations, local administrations and the private sector. They 
should get involved in designing strategies that help those furthest from the 
labour market to get jobs, thus bringing valuable human capital to national 
economies.   
 
7.1.2.  Follow-up at European level 
                                                 
125   The Commission has recently endorsed and decided to support projects that use social experimentation 
to implement innovative policies through the PROGRESS programme. See: Call for Proposals for 
Social Policy Experimentations (VP/2012/007).  
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•  Provide  explicit, policy-oriented, evidence-based monitoring
126 and 
guidance
127 to Member States to ensure better implementation of the active 
inclusion strategy at national level. The 2008 Commission recommendation has 
been interpreted in a variety of ways, and this has led to piecemeal 
implementation of the strategy, reducing its potential to make a difference. 
•  Further develop active inclusion indicators in the Social Protection Committee, 
Indicators Sub-Group. The work on indicators for access to quality services 
should be further developed. The most relevant indicators, those on healthcare, 
child care, and access to quality housing can be fine-tuned in collaboration with 
other policy initiatives in subfields such as the child poverty recommendation, 
development of a strategy on homelessness (2013 onwards), etc. Work should 
also focus on coverage of benefits and services. 
•  Mainstream the active inclusion strategy in the monitoring and evaluation of 
Europe 2020 headline targets in the area of social inclusion. Active inclusion 
contains the mix of policy interventions needed to fight poverty successfully. 
Progress towards achieving the targets can be better achieved through active 
inclusion. In this context, support for active inclusion in the next multiannual 
financial framework is essential. 
•  Strengthen administrative capacity and policy coordination of the three 
pillars through targeted support (e.g. with ESF funds). The report suggests 
that many countries face challenges when it comes to implementing integrated 
active inclusion strategies. These difficulties often arise from a lack of 
administrative capacity, or a lack of vertical and horizontal coordination of the 
three pillars. 
                                                 
126   Social Protection Performance Monitor, Council of the European Union, 13723/12. 
127   The Commission plans to develop an analysis for each individual country that would map the policy 
areas most in need of help if they are to deliver effective integrated active inclusion. These analyses 
could be used to justify ESF support on specific aspects of administrative capacity building or to 
highlight the need for streamlining to provide one-stop shops. .  
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8.  ANNEX 
 
Table 1. 1st pillar: first level of safety nets. Main characteristics of the unemployment 
benefit systems 
3 months
4-6 
months
7-12 
months
Total Single
Second 
earner
EU27 65.5 61.7 50.2 53.5 na na na na 45.0
AT 88.5 85.7 62.3 71.3 63.4 12.0 0.67 0.83 41.2
CY na na na na na 5.0 39.7
CZ 63.7 64.2 37.3 47.1 56.2 12.0 0.80 0.77 40.6
FR 68.6 69.8 67.3 68.0 58.4 36.0 0.77 0.73 33.5
NL 82.2 78.7 29.3 42.1 72.2 60.0 0.84 0.85 31.8
SE 64.9 20.0 0.75 0.88 36.3
SI 74.3 27.2 23.0 28.5 64.7 24.0 0.83 0.82 44.1
BE 75.0 73.1 93.7 89.0 66.2 na 0.93 0.79 30.4
DE 89.5 86.5 84.1 84.8 61.5 18.0 0.75 0.78 70.3
DK u 88.3 91.8 91.4 71.4 48.0 0.89 0.94 36.3
FI 69.4 17.0 0.72 0.93 45.3
UK 21.0 35.0 40.8 38.6 61.1 6.0 0.50 0.52 47.4
Group C IE na na na na 82.5 13.0 0.78 0.92 26.8
HU 68.4 65.8 55.5 59.4 37.7 9.0 0.82 0.82 44.8
BG 31.2 26.5 15.9 18.9 42.1 12.0 0.81 0.81 48.4
IT 75.7 66.5 25.9 33.9 9.1 10.0 0.78 0.73 43.6
MT 32.1 60.7 39.6 41.7 56.6 5.0 0.59 0.66 40.1
PL 36.7 31.7 18.4 23.3 46.5 12.0 0.82 0.72 45.4
RO 60.5 22.8 29.1 28.2 12.0 0.71 0.67 45.4
EE 61.7 50.0 44.8 47.5 41.4 12.0 0.63 0.57 46.7
EL 56.2 50.8 19.4 31.2 24.7 12.0 0.61 0.75 38.5
ES 64.8 69.5 51.4 55.5 47.7 24.0 0.83 0.77 38.7
LT na na na na 62.6 9.0 0.70 0.97 55.6
LV 53.3 53.6 36.8 40.7 43.3 9.0 0.90 0.90 47.9
PT 48.2 36.1 43.8 42.6 58.8 30.0 0.79 0.78 36.4
SK 49.6 40.6 25.6 29.5 40.1 6.0 0.68 0.58 41.1
LU 63.9 56.1 48.4 52.7 72.0 12.0 0.86 1.00 43.3
Group A
Group B
Group D
Group E
Coverage rate in % (1)
Net 
replacement 
rates
in % (2)
Max 
duration 
of UB 
in months 
(3)
At-risk 
poverty 
rate - 
unempl. 
In %(4)
Unemployment trap 
(2)
 
(1) EU-SILC Social Situation Observatory calculation for DG EMPL 
(2) OECD Tax benefit Model 
(3) MISSOC Database 
(4) Eurostat, EU SILC 
(5) Eurostat, LMP database 
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Table 2: 1
st pillar: second level of safety nets: Main characteristics of other safety nets 
available to people on low income (social assistance, housing benefits, etc.) 
3 months 4-6 months 7-12 months Total
single 
person
lone parent 
with 2 
children
Second 
earner
Single
One earner couple 
with 2 children
AT 90.7 88.2 70.6 77.4 49 50 46 0.65 0.83
CY
CZ 72.9 69.2 56.0 61.2 50 45 42 0.62 0.77
FR 77.5 81.0 84.9 83.4 41 42 36 0.61 0.68
NL 74 64 52 0.82 0.82
SE 56 48 43 0.70 0.88
SI 86.8 62.0 69.6 68.7 30 53 44 0.60 0.82
BE 76.5 76.2 95.4 90.9 45 55 39 0.67 0.67
DE 89.5 87.4 89.8 89.4 47 60 53 0.66 0.78
DK u 90.3 94.3 93.5 71 73 71 0.87 0.96
FI 57 56 50 0.69 0.93
UK 37.2 48.6 70.1 63.8 66 76 65 0.50 0.52
Group C IE 77 71 70 0.79 0.92
HU 73.7 76.7 66.4 69.8 31 39 29 0.50 0.48
BG 43.0 34.5 35.9 36.1 14 26 22 0.38 0.58
IT 79.0 69.3 33.6 40.6 0.24 0.00
MT 72.8 83.6 70.2 72.3 59 54 44 0.59 0.67
PL 45.5 40.9 30.2 34.2 31 41 33 0.51 0.57
RO 71.1 71.0 54.2 57.2 17 27 26 0.37 0.43
EE 67.8 59.0 48.6 52.9 32 34 31 0.46 0.57
EL 58.7 60.3 42.9 49.1 0 9 2 0.06 0.04
ES 67.1 72.3 56.5 60.0 35 33 25 0.45 0.48
LT 27 77 56 0.44 0.92
LV 63.0 62.9 47.9 51.3 36 50 46 0.59 0.90
PT 49.4 38.4 54.0 50.7 26 42 43 0.36 0.71
SK 63.0 51.3 55.6 55.1 23 33 30 0.40 0.58
LU 81.7 63.4 73.0 71.7 51 54 51 0.70 0.86
EU27 71.3 68.7 63.3 64.9
Group A
Group D
Group E
Group B
Financial DISINCENTIVE
Inactivity trap (2)
COVERAGE
% of people receiving any benefit
 including unemployment benefits (1)
ADEQUACY
Net income of people living on social 
assistance relative to the median 
equivalised income (incl. cash housing 
assistance) (2)
 
(1) EU-SILC Social Situation Observatory calculation for DG EMPL; Benefits include: sickness, disability and social exclusion 
benefits and education allowances 
(2) OECD Tax benefit Model 
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Table 3: 2nd pillar: Main characteristics linked to the inclusiveness of the labour market 
into poverty (%)  out of poverty (%) Single Second earner
EU27 26.1 25.9 0.44 0.44 : :
CZ 91.0 18.5 37 2.8 40.5 9.9 0.2
FR 107.5 30.8 10.6 5.6 45.6 45.1 0.8
CY 49.4 22.1 4.3 43.0 0.32 0.53 19 0.2
NL 131.3 7.2 20 2.3 36.2 0.33 0.33 45.4 0.8
AT 10.1 40.5 5.3 49.9 0.23 0.34 28 0.7
SI 77.0 8 31.8 2.8 31.1 0.30 0.38 15.9 0.3
SE 27.5 43.9 0.30 0.13 26.9 0.8
BE 108.3 10.4 36.1 4.4 38.8 0.54919226 0.476741272 95.5 1.3
DK 16.1 3.4 38.9 0.52 0.29 50.7 1.4
DE 17 41 0.47 0.73 30 0.6
FI 28.8 48.7 3.8 38.1 0.35 0.22 26.7 0.9
UK 128.9 18.9 72.1 7.4 51.8 0.31 0.90 1.5 0
Group C IE 125.0 37.7 5.8 40.2 0.23 0.23 25.7 0.8
BG 57.6 36.7 7.4 36.6 0.20890136 0.208901359 4.1 0.1
IT 54.5 25 6.2 33.6 0.42 0.95 21.4 0.4
HU 84.5 39.4 39.2 5.3 40.9 0.27 0.93 20.3 0.5
MT 16.1 10 8.1 32.1 0.32 1.07 6.9 0
PL 88.8 24.8 22.4 0.52 0.85 20.1 0.6
RO 53 61 0.35 0.11 3.2 0
EE 69.1 22 17.2 6.5 33.1 0.41 0.99 3.8 0.1
EL 102.8 60.5 18 7.9 31.6 0.16 0.16 12.4 0.2
ES 91.7 55.5 16.4 8.8 43.6 0.29 0.06 47.6 0.7
LV 42.1 35.3 8.7 32.5 0.39 0.39 8.5 0.5
LT 37.4 46.3 7.0 33.6 0.26 0.62 4.7 0.2
PT 105.4 45.8 29.6 0.30 0.33 28.7 0.6
SK 83.0 24.4 39.9 0.29 0.61 21.2 0.2
LU 87.0 9.9 26 3.5 29.0 0.39 0.54 62.4 0.4
Low-wage trap Activation-Support 
(LMP participants per 
100 persons wanting 
to work) 2010 ex UK 
(5)
Expenditure on ALMP 
(services and 2-7) as 
% of GDP  (5)
Group E
Involuntary part-time 
employment as 
percentage of the total 
part-time employment 
(1)
Transitions from 
temporary to 
permanent 
employment (2)
Transitions in/out of poverty (2)
Group A
Group B
Group D
Net income of full 
time minimum 
wage earner
 
 
(1)  Eurostat  LFS  Survey          
(2) Eurostat EU SILC Survey DG  E M P L   c a l c u l a t i o n          
(3)  OECD  Tax  benefit  Model          
(4) OECD Tax benefit Model — Median net household incomes are before housing costs (or other forms of ‘committed’ 
expenditure). Results are shown on an equivalised basis and account for all relevant cash benefits (social assistance, family benefits, 
housing-related cash support as indicated). Income levels are net of any income taxes and social contributions and account for all cash 
benefit entitlements of a family with a working-age head employed full-time at the minimum wage. Annual minimum wages as 
reported on OECD.stat. Calculations for families with children assume two children aged 4 and 6 and neither childcare benefits nor 
childcare costs are considered. Poverty threshold set at 60 % of the national median income.     
  
( 5 )   L M P   d a t a b a s e            
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Table 4: 3rd pillar: indicators of access to services 
Use of formal 
childcare more 
than 30 hrs/week, 
children less than 
3 (1)
Housing cost 
overburden rate 
among AROP 
population(2)
Unmeet need for care  
(3)
Participation in 
education and 
training for low 
educated  
in % (4)
EU27 14 40.4 4.3 11
CZ 0 44.9 1 24.8
FR 26 25 5.9 7.1
CY 13 11.2 7.8 3.8
NL 6 51.3 0.8 19.4
AT 3 31.4 2 16.3
SI 33 25.8 0.2 15.9
SE 33 47.4 4.1 28.2
BE 19 43 2.3 8.1
DK 68 79.8 3.7 36.4
DE 13 42 2
FI 20 20.3 3.4 23.5
UK 4 60.9 1.8 9.6
Group C IE 8 28.5 2.3 6.9
HU 8 43.7 2.8 11.6
BG 6 18.5 22.7 9.3
IT 16 31.1 7.2 5.7
MT 4 12.6 1.5 5.4
PL 2 37.6 7.5 22.4
RO 3 23.4 7.5 6.6
EE 19 34.1 6.3 24.5
EL 5 72.4 5.6 2.6
ES 18 46 0.4 7.8
LV 15 41.4 23.7 18.4
LT 11 38.2 1.4 28.2
PT 32 30.7 3.7 10.1
SK 3 37.4 2 22.6
LU 19 27.2 1.7 18.7
Group A
Group E
Group B
Group D
 
(1) Source EU SILC 
(2) EU SILC 18-64 population 
(3) EU SILC 18-44 population 
(4) Source LFS 
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Table 5. Individual experts’ assessments of the extent to which an integrated 
comprehensive active inclusion strategy has been developed in their Member State (for 
those who can/ cannot work) 
 
Comprehensive policy 
design  Integrated implementation  Vertical policy 
coordination 
Active participation of 
relevant actors 
 
Yes  Some-
what  No Yes  Some-
what  No Yes  Some-
what  No Yes  Some-
what  No 
For 
those 
who 
can 
work 
DK, FI, 
FR, 
MT, 
NL, PL, 
SE 
AT, BE, 
BG, 
CY, 
CZ, 
DE, 
ES, 
HU, IE, 
LU, PT, 
RO, SI, 
SK, UK 
EE, EL, 
IT, LT, 
LV 
BE, 
DK, 
FR, 
MT, SI, 
SE 
AT, 
BG, 
CY, 
CZ, 
DE, FI, 
HU, IE, 
LU, NL, 
PT, 
RO, UK 
EE, EL, 
ES, IT, 
LV, LT, 
PL, SK 
BE, 
DK, FI, 
LU, NL 
AT, ES, 
CY, 
CZ, 
DE, IE, 
IT, LV, 
MT, 
PL, 
RO, SI, 
SK, 
SE, UK 
EE, EL, 
FR, 
HU, LT, 
PT 
BE, 
BG, 
DK, 
ES, FI, 
LU, NL, 
SI, SE 
AT, 
CY, 
CZ, 
DE, 
FR, IT, 
LV, 
MT, 
PL, PT, 
RO, 
SK, UK 
EE, EL, 
HU, IE, 
LT 
For 
those 
who 
cannot 
work 
NL, SI 
AT, 
BG, 
CY, 
CZ, 
DK, 
ES, FI, 
FR, 
HU, 
LU, 
MT, 
PT, 
RO, 
SK, UK 
BE, 
DE, 
EE, EL, 
IE, IT, 
LT, LV, 
PL, SE 
LU, 
MT, SI 
AT, BE, 
CY, 
CZ, 
DK, FI, 
FR, 
HU, IT, 
NL, PT, 
RO, UK 
BG, 
DE, 
EE, EL, 
ES, LV, 
LT, PL, 
SK, SE 
BE, 
DK, FI, 
LU, NL 
AT, 
CY, 
CZ, 
ES, IT, 
LV, 
MT, 
RO, 
SE, SI, 
SK, UK 
DE, 
EE, EL, 
FR, 
HU, IE, 
LT, PL, 
PT 
BE, 
CY, 
DK, FI, 
NL, SI 
AT, 
BG, 
CZ, 
ES, 
FR, IT, 
LU, LV, 
MT, 
PL, PT, 
RO, 
SE, 
SK, UK 
DE, 
EE, EL, 
HU, IE, 
LT 
 
Source: EU Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion (Frazer, H. and Marlier, E. 
2012). Assessment of the implementation of the European Commission recommendation on active 
inclusion. 
 